Agent Skills
› mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad
› supply-chain-audit
supply-chain-audit
GitHub用于审计构建和发布供应链安全，检查依赖、镜像、CI流程及发布链路的完整性与可复现性，识别未锁定版本、签名缺失及权限滥用风险。
Trigger Scenarios
审计项目依赖安全性
验证构建发布链路完整性
检查CI/CD流水线配置风险
Install
npx skills add mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad --skill supply-chain-audit -g -y
SKILL.md
Frontmatter
{
"name": "supply-chain-audit",
"audience": "specialist",
"description": "Use when auditing whether anything outside the project can silently alter a build or published release—inventory dependencies, base images, binaries, generators, CI actions, install hooks, secret exposure, and publisher controls; verify pins, digests or signatures, reproducibility, and one artifact's end-to-end provenance. Use dependency-health-triage for advisory reachability alone; this owns build and release integrity."
}
Supply Chain Audit
Audit everything that enters a build or a release without being written by the project, and everything that can modify the release on its way out.
Steps
- Inventory inputs: package dependencies, base images, downloaded binaries and installers, CI actions and plugins, and build-time code generators.
- Check pinning and integrity for each input — exact versions, lockfile presence, checksum or digest verification, and signature verification where the ecosystem supports it. A floating tag is an unpinned input.
- Audit the CI/CD pipeline as attacker surface: who can trigger a build, what secrets each job can read, whether pull-request builds from forks get privileged tokens, and whether build steps can be influenced by the code they are building.
- Check third-party CI actions specifically — pinned to a commit SHA rather than a mutable tag, and reviewed for the permissions they request.
- Look for typosquat and confusion risk: internal package names resolvable from a public registry, recently-renamed or transferred packages, and single-maintainer packages with sudden ownership changes.
- Verify the release path: who can publish, whether publishing requires review, whether artifacts are signed, and whether the published artifact can be reproduced from the tagged source.
- Check install-time execution — post-install scripts, build hooks, and container entrypoint fetches — as these run with developer or build privilege.
- Trace the provenance chain end to end for at least one artifact, and record every point where the chain relies on trust rather than verification.
- Rank findings by whether they permit silent modification of shipped code; that class outranks everything else here.
Acceptance
- All build inputs are inventoried with their pinning and integrity-verification state.
- CI permissions, fork-build behavior, and third-party action pinning are checked and recorded.
- Dependency-confusion and ownership-change risks are examined for internal names.
- The release path is traced end to end, with every trust-not-verification point named.
- Findings that permit silent modification of shipped artifacts are ranked highest.
Version History
- d5262e2 Current 2026-09-11 11:38
