Agent Skills
› lawve-ai/awesome-legal-skills
› lawve-agentic-delegation-audit-ignacio-adrian-lerer
lawve-agentic-delegation-audit-ignacio-adrian-lerer
GitHub用于评估AI代理在LegalOps中的安全性。针对具备发送、执行等行动能力的AI,提供授权、监督、问责与控制审计框架,涵盖自主性分类、权限映射及可观测性等步骤,确保合规与风险控制。
触发场景
律师或客户需评估具有行动能力的AI代理工作流
产品或法务团队将AI接入邮件、支付等外部系统
需要解释Agentic AI在治理层面的风险
安装
npx skills add lawve-ai/awesome-legal-skills --skill lawve-agentic-delegation-audit-ignacio-adrian-lerer -g -y
SKILL.md
Frontmatter
{
"name": "lawve-agentic-delegation-audit-ignacio-adrian-lerer",
"metadata": {
"author": "Ignacio Adrián Lerer",
"license": "agpl-3.0",
"version": "2026-06-05"
},
"description": "Use when a lawyer, legal team, or client needs to assess AI agents that can act on someone's behalf: send messages, search, draft, file, pay, delete, connect to accounts, use tools, or rely on external data. Produces a practical delegation, oversight, accountability, and control audit for legal operations."
}
Lawve Agentic Delegation Audit
Use this skill to help lawyers evaluate whether an AI agent workflow is safe enough to use in legal or business operations.
Core idea:
When AI only answers, the user evaluates an output.
When AI acts, the user delegates authority.
Delegated authority needs controls, logs, revocation, and accountability.
Use When
- A client wants to use an AI agent for legal, compliance, business, or administrative work.
- A product, law firm, or legal ops team is connecting an agent to email, files, CRM, court portals, payments, messaging, calendars, databases, browser tools, or code execution.
- A lawyer needs to explain the risks of agentic AI in practical governance terms.
- A workflow may send, file, delete, approve, purchase, publish, sign, deploy, or change access.
- A system claims to be "autonomous", "agentic", "assistant with tools", "AI employee", "legal copilot", or "workflow agent".
Do Not Use For
- Pure doctrinal legal research with no agentic action.
- Final legal opinions without jurisdiction-specific legal review.
- Technical implementation of an agent runtime.
- Approving production use of an agent without evidence, logs, and controls.
Intake
Collect only what is necessary:
- What task does the agent perform?
- Who is the human principal?
- Who deploys or operates the agent?
- What systems, accounts, files, channels, or tools can it access?
- What actions can it take without step-by-step approval?
- Which actions are irreversible, external, financial, legal, confidential, or reputation-sensitive?
- What logs exist and who can read them?
- How can the user pause, revoke, appeal, or correct the agent?
- What data can influence the agent, including emails, webpages, chats, files, tickets, and prompts?
Audit Steps
-
Classify the autonomy level
answer_only: produces information only.draft_only: drafts but does not send or change records.approval_gated_actor: acts only after explicit approval.policy_bounded_actor: acts within predefined limits.long_running_actor: continues across time, sessions, or triggers.
-
Map delegated authority
- Name the principal.
- Name the deployer/operator.
- List what authority the agent has.
- Separate read, draft, internal write, external write, financial, legal-sensitive, and privileged actions.
-
Check observability
- Can the user see what the agent did?
- Are tool calls and external actions logged?
- Are logs understandable by a non-developer?
- Are source data and model inference separated?
-
Check control and revocation
- Can the user pause the agent?
- Can permissions be narrowed?
- Can access be revoked quickly?
- Are irreversible actions previewed before execution?
-
Check accountability
- Who is responsible if harm occurs?
- Is responsibility split across vendor, deployer, user, professional, and client?
- Is there a human review point before legal reliance or external action?
-
Check attack surface
- Can untrusted content influence the agent?
- Does the agent process emails, webpages, chats, documents, tickets, or social posts as instructions?
- Are external content and system instructions separated?
- Are prompt injection, data exfiltration, and tool misuse considered?
-
Apply legal uncertainty gate
- Use
PASS,ESCALATE, orBLOCKfor downstream legal/business reliance. - Do not hide material uncertainty in disclaimer text.
- Use
Output
Use this compact format:
## Agentic Delegation Audit
### Verdict
PASS | NEEDS CONTROLS | BLOCK
### Why
[2-5 sentences]
### Delegated Authority
- Principal:
- Deployer/operator:
- Autonomy level:
- Systems/tools:
- Highest-risk action:
### Control Checklist
- Permission scope: adequate | weak | missing
- Human approval before external/legal/financial action: yes | partial | no
- User-readable logs: yes | partial | no
- Revocation/pause: yes | partial | no
- Prompt-injection/data-boundary controls: yes | partial | no
- Accountability owner: clear | partial | unclear
### Required Controls
- [control 1]
- [control 2]
- [control 3]
### Legal Reliance Gate
PASS | ESCALATE | BLOCK
### Next Step
[smallest practical next step]
Decision Rules
PASS: agent is draft-only or tightly approval-gated, logs are clear, permissions are scoped, and no material legal/client risk remains unmanaged.NEEDS CONTROLS: agent may be useful, but missing controls prevent safe operational reliance.BLOCK: agent can perform external, legal, financial, confidential, destructive, or privileged actions without adequate approval, logging, revocation, or accountability.
版本历史
- 8e51264 当前 2026-07-31 02:33


