relay-transport
GitHub指导在OpenChamber中正确添加或修改WebSocket、SSE等实时传输端点,确保通过加密隧道透明工作,避免直连导致的认证和连接失败问题。
Trigger Scenarios
Install
npx skills add openchamber/openchamber --skill relay-transport -g -y
SKILL.md
Frontmatter
{
"name": "relay-transport",
"license": "MIT",
"description": "Use when adding or changing OpenChamber WebSocket, SSE, streaming, realtime endpoints, shared UI sockets, runtime transport internals, private relay behavior, or files under the UI\/server relay modules.",
"compatibility": "opencode"
}
Overview
OpenChamber has a private relay: a client (mobile app, browser, another desktop) reaches a user's instance through an OpenChamber-hosted relay over an end-to-end encrypted tunnel. All of the app's traffic — many HTTP requests, the event stream (SSE), and WebSockets (terminal, dictation) — is multiplexed and encrypted through one connection per client.
Architecture overview: packages/web/server/lib/relay/DOCUMENTATION.md. Code: packages/ui/src/lib/relay/ (client + shared, TS) and packages/web/server/lib/relay/ (host, JS).
Load ui-api-decoupling when the change adds or alters a shared runtime API, URL/auth contract, bridge, proxy, or runtime-switch behavior. This skill owns relay mechanics; ui-api-decoupling owns the shared UI/runtime boundary.
Why this skill exists: relay bugs do not show up in normal testing. The event stream is SSE (which behaves differently from WebSockets), so a new WebSocket feature is often the first real WebSocket to cross the tunnel on mobile — and it fails there while working everywhere else. We have fixed the same class of bug across several iterations. The rules below are those lessons.
The core mental model
- The tunnel is transparent. A feature should reach the server through the shared runtime transport (
runtimeFetch,openRuntimeWebSocket) and never know whether it is direct or relayed. If a feature constructs its ownfetch/WebSocketagainst a runtime URL, it bypasses the tunnel and breaks in relay mode. - Three transports behave differently over the tunnel:
- HTTP and SSE authenticate with the client's bearer token (a header). They "just work" through the tunnel for any allowlisted
/api/*,/auth/*,/healthpath. - WebSockets cannot send headers. They authenticate with a short-lived URL-scoped token (
oc_url_token) that must be minted first and passed as a query parameter. This is the source of most relay WS bugs.
- HTTP and SSE authenticate with the client's bearer token (a header). They "just work" through the tunnel for any allowlisted
WebSocket Endpoint Branch
Adding a new WS endpoint (or porting one, e.g. the planned terminal port) requires ALL of these, or it breaks over the relay:
- Open it via
openRuntimeWebSocket(packages/ui/src/lib/relay/runtime-socket.ts), nevernew WebSocket(...)directly. A rawnew WebSocketagainst a runtime URL fails in relay mode (the resolver yields a tunnel-virtual/custom-scheme URL the platform rejects — surfaced as "The string did not match the expected pattern"). - Add the path to BOTH allowlists (they are separate and both required):
- Host tunnel dispatcher:
ALLOWED_WS_PATHSinpackages/web/server/lib/relay/tunnel-host.js. - URL-token auth gate:
isUrlAuthWebSocketPathinpackages/web/server/lib/ui-auth/ui-auth.js(otherwise theoc_url_tokenis refused for that path → 401).
- Host tunnel dispatcher:
- Mint the URL token before connecting. Call
refreshRuntimeUrlAuthToken()and build the URL through the resolver'swebsocket(...)sooc_url_tokenis appended. SSE/HTTP do not need this; WS does. - Do not touch origin handling. The server rejects WS upgrades whose
Originit does not trust. Over the tunnel the host dials loopback and presents the loopback origin (http://127.0.0.1:<port>), which the server trusts as same-origin — this already covers every allowlisted WS path. Never reintroduce reliance onwindow.location.origin: in the iOS WKWebView it is"null"/empty for the custom scheme, so forwarding it produces a 403. - Test over the relay, not just direct/desktop. A new WS may be the first WebSocket the mobile client runs through the tunnel (events are SSE-locked on Capacitor). Passing on desktop or a direct connection proves nothing about the relay path.
Wire Format And Codec Branch
- Two implementations must stay byte-compatible. The E2EE and framing exist as TS (
packages/ui/src/lib/relay/{crypto,handshake,tunnel-codec}.ts, normative) and a JS host mirror (packages/web/server/lib/relay/{e2ee,tunnel-codec}.js). Any wire-format, frame-type, handshake, or batching change must update both and keeppackages/web/server/lib/relay/cross-compat.test.jsgreen. - Frame types live in
protocol.tsand must match acrossprotocol.ts,tunnel-codec.ts, andtunnel-codec.js. Adding a frame type without mirroring it corrupts the stream on one side. - Frame batching is capability-negotiated in the handshake with a legacy fallback, so mixed client/host app versions still interoperate. Preserve the negotiation and the single-frame fallback; do not make batching unconditional.
- The encrypted-frame counter/IV is per-direction and strictly increasing. One encrypted WS message = one encrypt call = one counter tick. Keep encrypt+send serialized per direction; do not reorder or parallelize it.
Runtime Transport Branch
- Relay mode routes through
runtime-switch(activates the tunnel singleton),runtime-fetch(routes runtime requests through it),runtime-url/runtime-socket(tunnel-backed URLs/sockets), andruntime-auth(mints the URL token through the tunnel). When refactoring any of these, preserve the relay branch and the direct-URL/Electron-realtime-proxy branches — they must remain byte-identical in behavior for non-relay runtimes. - The host dispatcher never injects credentials. Tunneled requests carry the client's own token; the server authenticates them. Do not add host-side auth shortcuts, and do not trust loopback source address as authentication (relay traffic arrives at loopback but represents remote clients).
Reconnect Branch
For indefinite SSE/WebSocket reconnect loops:
- Use exponential backoff based on consecutive failures, not a constant short delay.
- Use the long backoff cap while
navigator.onLineis false ordocument.visibilityStateis hidden. - Treat permanent 4xx responses as long-backoff failures; keep 408 and 429 retryable.
- Make waits interruptible by
online, visibility becoming visible, and the pipeline abort signal. - Reset failure state only after a genuinely healthy connection.
Blind short retries on hidden, offline, unauthorized, or stale-path clients waste battery and flood server logs.
Verification
- Exercise the real auth and origin gates. An end-to-end test whose stub server accepts any WS upgrade will pass while the real server rejects it — this is precisely how the origin-check bug shipped. When writing a relay integration test, mirror the real gates (
ensureSessionTokenviaoc_url_token,isRequestOriginAllowed) or run against the real server pieces. - Run relay tests per file (
bun test <file>); the suite has order sensitivity. - Validate both sides:
packages/uitype-check/lint, andnode --checkon changed JS host files.
Completion requires every applicable branch above: WS path allowlists/auth/origin and real relay exercise; mirrored TS/JS wire changes with cross-compat coverage; preserved direct and relay runtime branches; or reconnect pacing under offline, hidden, permanent-failure, recovery, and abort conditions.
Version History
-
2db90f7
Current 2026-08-20 04:55
文档优化:细化了Agent技能指南,补充了WebSocket端点创建的完整检查清单(如allowlists配置和URL Token生成步骤)。
- 74b1bd8 2026-07-25 10:37


