dcg
GitHub处理破坏性命令拦截,配置 Agent 安全护栏。提供被阻断时的标准工作流、风险分级审批机制及替代方案建议,确保操作安全合规。
Trigger Scenarios
Install
npx skills add boshu2/agentops --skill dcg -g -y
SKILL.md
Frontmatter
{
"name": "dcg",
"consumes": [],
"metadata": {
"tier": "execution",
"effects": [
"write_dcg_config"
],
"disposition": "keep_specialist",
"capabilities": [
"dcg"
],
"dependencies": [],
"canonical_status": "canonical"
},
"produces": [],
"practices": [
"pragmatic-programmer"
],
"context_rel": [],
"description": "Handle blocked destructive commands and configure agent safety guardrails. Triggers: \"dcg\", \"handle a DCG block\", \"configure agent safety guardrails\".",
"hexagonal_role": "supporting",
"user-invocable": false,
"output_contract": "the blocked command, matched rule, surviving risk, and validated safe alternative; config writes only when explicitly requested",
"skill_api_version": 1
}
DCG: When You Get Blocked
Core Insight: Blocks are checkpoints, not errors. A safe alternative almost always exists. Find it before mentioning override.
Constraints
- Never request, generate, or run an allow-once bypass because only the human may authorize and execute the exact blocked command.
- Preserve the user's intended outcome with the narrowest reversible alternative because the guard protects state, not merely command spelling.
- Explain the matched rule and surviving risk before asking for judgment; never retry, obfuscate, or route around a DCG block.
Quick Navigation
| I need to... | Go to |
|---|---|
| Handle a block right now | THE EXACT WORKFLOW |
| Find a safe alternative | Safe Alternatives |
| See all CLI commands | COMMANDS.md |
| Enable more rule packs | PACKS.md |
| Configure per-project | CONFIG.md |
| Debug hook issues | TROUBLESHOOTING.md |
THE EXACT WORKFLOW
When blocked, follow this sequence every time:
1. Run `dcg explain "cmd"` → Understand why (see trace)
2. Check Safe Alternatives table → Use if exists (DON'T mention override)
3. No alternative? → Explain risk clearly, let human decide
4. Human approves? → THEY run: dcg allow-once CODE
Never: Ask for override first. Never retry silently. Never circumvent.
Risk-tiered approval counts
When no safe alternative exists and the human must decide, the number of distinct human approvals scales with what the command can destroy:
| Tier | Blast radius | Approvals required |
|---|---|---|
| Recoverable | undoable via reflog/stash/trash/backup | 1 allow-once for this exact command |
| Destructive-local | permanently deletes local, uncommitted, or unbacked state | 1 allow-once, granted only after you name the exact state lost and confirm no backup exists |
| Destructive-shared | shared history, remote branches, databases, namespaces others use | 1 approval per individual command occurrence — never batched, never pattern-widened |
Stop conditions: never present a tier-2 or tier-3 command as tier-1; never convert several pending blocks into one blanket approval. A single "yes" that gets spent across multiple destructive commands is the approval laundering failure mode — each allow-once code is bound to one command in one directory, and the workflow must keep it that way.
Example block output:
BLOCKED: git reset --hard HEAD
Rule: core.git:reset-hard
Reason: Discards uncommitted changes permanently
Allow-once code: ab12
Safer alternative: git stash
Good response:
"I wanted to discard changes but
git reset --hardwas blocked. Let me usegit stashinstead—recoverable if needed." [proceeds with stash]
Safe Alternatives
| Blocked | Use Instead | Why |
|---|---|---|
git reset --hard |
git stash |
Recoverable |
git checkout -- file |
git stash push file |
Preserves changes |
git push --force |
git push --force-with-lease |
Checks remote unchanged |
git clean -fd |
git clean -fdn (preview) |
Shows what would delete |
git stash drop |
git stash list first |
Verify which stash |
rm -rf /path |
rm -ri /path or verify path |
Interactive/confirm |
kubectl delete namespace |
kubectl delete -l app=X |
Selective deletion |
DROP DATABASE |
Backup first | Human approves |
docker system prune -a |
docker system df first |
See what's used |
Quick Reference
dcg doctor # Health check — hook registered?
dcg explain "cmd" # WHY is it blocked? (with trace)
dcg test "cmd" # Would this be blocked? (dry-run)
dcg allow-once CODE # Human approves (THEY run this)
dcg packs # List available rule packs
dcg scan --staged # Pre-commit: scan for issues
What Gets Blocked
| Category | Patterns | Safe Variants |
|---|---|---|
| Git destructive | reset --hard, checkout -- |
stash, restore --staged |
| Git history | push --force, branch -D |
--force-with-lease, -d |
| Git stash | stash drop, stash clear |
stash list first |
| Filesystem | rm -rf (dangerous paths) |
/tmp/* allowed |
| Database | DROP, TRUNCATE, DELETE w/o WHERE |
Add WHERE clause |
| K8s | delete namespace, delete --all |
-l label selector |
Context-aware (measured on dcg 0.5.6): the temp carve-out allows rm -rf
under /tmp, /private/tmp, /var/tmp, and the literal $TMPDIR form.
Everything else — rm -rf ./build and other relative paths
(core.filesystem:rm-rf-general), absolute paths like /home/... and /
(core.filesystem:rm-rf-root-home), and even /private/var/tmp — is blocked.
Unresolved variables other than $TMPDIR are not treated as temp.
dcg explain example (7-step pipeline):
$ dcg explain "git reset --hard HEAD"
BLOCKED by core.git:reset-hard
Evaluation trace:
1. Config allow overrides: no match
2. Config block overrides: no match
3. Heredoc detection: not applicable
4. Quick reject: triggered (contains "reset")
5. Context sanitization: no changes
6. Normalization: git reset --hard HEAD
7. Pack evaluation:
- Safe patterns: no match
- Destructive: MATCH "reset --hard"
Suggestion: Use `git stash` to preserve changes
Anti-Patterns
❌ "Command blocked. Run dcg allow-once ab12" → Find alternative first!
❌ *Retrying silently or circumventing* → Always acknowledge blocks
❌ Treating blocks as errors → They're checkpoints
❌ Asking user to allow-once without explaining → They need context
Configuration
# .dcg.toml — enable rule packs per-project
[packs]
enabled = ["database.postgresql", "kubernetes.kubectl", "cloud.aws"]
[overrides]
allow_patterns = ["rm -rf ./node_modules"] # Project-specific safe
Environment variables:
DCG_PACKS="containers.docker,kubernetes"— Enable packsDCG_DISABLE="kubernetes.helm"— Disable specific packsDCG_BYPASS=1— Escape hatch (human-only)
Key Facts
- 49+ rule packs available (database, containers, k8s, cloud, etc.)
- Sub-millisecond latency — won't slow your workflow
- Fail-open on timeout — if DCG hangs, command runs (with warning)
- Heredoc scanning — inline scripts (
bash -c,python -c) are analyzed - Inline-fragment false positives — because scanning matches a destructive token anywhere in the command string, a pattern that appears only as data (a commit message body, a here-doc payload, a probe argument) can trip a block even though nothing destructive would run. Safe pattern: keep the payload off the command line — pass it via a file or stdin (e.g.
git commit -F <file>), or run the intended tool directly instead of inlining the text. Never reconstruct a blocked command by splitting or escaping its tokens to slip past the guard — that defeats the safety layer. - Allow-once codes — 4 hex chars, 24h expiry, bound to exact command+directory
The Incident That Started It All
On December 17, 2025, an AI agent ran
git checkout --on files containing hours of uncommitted work. The files were recovered viagit fsck --lost-found, but it proved: instructions don't prevent execution—mechanical enforcement does.
Validation
# Quick health check
dcg doctor | head -20
# Test if a command would be blocked
dcg test "git reset --hard HEAD"
# Should show: WOULD BE BLOCKED
Output Specification
- Path: the response and command output on stdout/stderr; write
.dcg.tomlor.dcg/allowlist.tomlonly when configuration was explicitly requested. - Filename: preserve DCG's project filenames exactly; ordinary block handling creates no persistent file.
- Format: state the blocked command, matched rule, risk, reversible alternative, and the alternative's validation result; quote commands exactly.
- Exit code: run
bash skills/dcg/scripts/validate-dcg.shand require zero for installation/configuration work; a blockeddcg testresult is expected evidence, not permission to bypass. - Downstream handoff: proceed with the validated safe alternative, or hand the exact risk and allow-once choice to the human when no equivalent exists.
Quality Checklist
- The response identifies the exact block and rule without exposing or suggesting an unauthorized bypass path.
- The chosen alternative is narrower, reversible where possible, and demonstrably preserves the user's requested outcome.
- Validation distinguishes an expected destructive-command block from a broken DCG installation or configuration.
Scripts
| Script | Usage |
|---|---|
./scripts/validate-dcg.sh |
Full installation validation |
References
- COMMANDS.md — Full CLI reference with
dcg explain,dcg scan - PACKS.md — 49+ rule pack system (database, k8s, cloud, etc.)
- CONFIG.md — Configuration, agent profiles, heredoc settings
- SCENARIOS.md — Detailed examples with good/bad responses
- PHILOSOPHY.md — Why DCG works this way
- TROUBLESHOOTING.md — Common issues and fixes
Version History
-
7b07a7d
Current 2026-08-19 21:59
修正了关于允许 rm -rf 的错误声明及无效规则 ID;移除了可执行的安全规避代码,改为文件/stdin 处理;更新了版本和路径信息。
- 3f402e5 2026-07-24 22:07


