threat-model
GitHub为代码库构建威胁模型，支持访谈、引导及组合模式。通过静态分析识别潜在风险与攻击面，生成标准化THREAT_MODEL.md文件，用于指导漏洞发现优先级和系统安全加固，不执行实际代码或网络请求。
Trigger Scenarios
Install
npx skills add anthropics/defending-code-reference-harness --skill threat-model -g -y
SKILL.md
Frontmatter
{
"name": "threat-model",
"description": "Build a threat model for a target codebase. Three modes: \"interview\" walks an application owner through the four-question framework and produces a threat model from their answers; \"bootstrap\" derives a threat model from the code plus past vulnerabilities (CVEs, git history, pentest reports) when no owner is available; \"bootstrap-then-interview\" chains the two when both owner and codebase are present. All write THREAT_MODEL.md in a shared schema. Use when asked to \"threat model\", \"build a threat model\", \"map the attack surface\", or \"what should we be worried about in this codebase\".",
"allowed-tools": [
"Read",
"Glob",
"Bash(python3 .claude\/skills\/_lib\/checkpoint.py:*)",
"Grep",
"Write",
"Bash(git:*)",
"Bash(gh api:*)",
"Bash(find:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
"AskUserQuestion",
"Task"
],
"argument-hint": "[bootstrap-then-interview|bootstrap|interview] <target-dir> [--vulns <file>] [--design-doc <file>] [--seed <THREAT_MODEL.md>] [--fresh]"
}
threat-model
A threat model answers "what could go wrong with this system, who would do it, and what should we do about it?" independently of whether any specific bug has been found yet. It is the map; vulnerability discovery is the metal detector. A good threat model tells the pipeline where to look and tells triage which findings matter.
Litmus test: If patching one line of code makes an entry disappear, it was
a vulnerability, not a threat. A threat ("attacker achieves RCE via untrusted
media parsing") still stands after every known bug is fixed; a vulnerability
("dr_wav.h:412 doesn't bounds-check chunk_size") does not. This skill
produces threats. Vulnerabilities appear only as evidence that raises a
threat's likelihood score.
Invocation: /threat-model [bootstrap-then-interview|bootstrap|interview] <target-dir> [flags]
Step 0 — Safety preamble (always runs first)
This skill performs static analysis only. It reads source, git history,
and any vulnerability reports the user supplies, and writes a single output
file (<target-dir>/THREAT_MODEL.md). It does not build, execute, fuzz, or
modify the target, and does not make network requests against the target's
infrastructure.
Before proceeding, confirm and state in your first response:
- The target directory exists and is a local checkout you can read.
- You will not execute any code from the target directory.
- If
--vulnspoints at a URL or you are asked to "fetch CVEs", you will query only public advisory databases (NVD, GitHub Security Advisories, the project's own issue tracker) and never the target's live deployment.
If the user asks you to validate a threat by running an exploit, decline and
point them at the vuln-pipeline (README Step 2) instead.
Step 1 — Route to a mode
Parse $ARGUMENTS:
| First token | Route to |
|---|---|
interview |
Read interview.md in this directory and follow it. |
bootstrap |
Read bootstrap.md in this directory and follow it. |
bootstrap-then-interview |
Bootstrap first, then interview seeded from the draft. See below. |
| anything else, or empty | Ask the user: "Is someone who owns or built this system available to answer questions in this session?" Yes and the codebase is checked out → recommend bootstrap-then-interview. Yes but no codebase → interview.md. No → bootstrap.md. |
All modes write the same artifact (THREAT_MODEL.md, schema in schema.md)
so downstream consumers (pipeline recon/judge, verifier agents) do not need
to know which mode produced it.
interview |
bootstrap |
|
|---|---|---|
| Needs | An application owner present in the session | A local checkout; optionally past vulns |
| Method | Four-question framework: conversational walk through what are we working on → what can go wrong → what are we going to do about it → did we do a good job | Five stages: parallel research swarm → synthesize sections 1-3 + vuln table → generalize vulns into threat classes → STRIDE gap-fill → emit |
| Best for | New systems, design reviews, systems where the risk lives in business logic the code doesn't show | Inherited systems, third-party code, OSS dependencies, anything with a CVE history |
| Provenance tag | interview |
bootstrap |
Context durability. Interview mode is multi-turn; tool results from early reads may be evicted before you need them. To stay resilient:
- Do not read
interview.mdorbootstrap.mdin full up front. Read the mode file (or the relevant section of it) at the point you need it, one question or stage at a time. - If a re-read via the Read tool is refused as "file unchanged", the prior
result was evicted; reload with
cat <path>via Bash instead.
Interview backbone (so you can proceed even if interview.md is
unavailable mid-session):
| Q | Question | Fills schema sections |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 | What are we working on? | section 1 context, section 2 assets, section 3 entry points |
| Q2 | What can go wrong? | section 4 threat rows (id, threat, actor, surface, asset) |
| Q3 | What are we going to do about it? | section 4 impact/likelihood/status/controls; section 5 deprioritized; section 8 recommended mitigations |
| Q4 | Did we do a good job? | validate ranking, coverage check, section 6 open questions |
bootstrap-then-interview mode
When the owner is available and the codebase is checked out, this is the recommended path: the owner's time goes to refining a code-grounded draft instead of describing the system from scratch.
- Tell the owner: "I'll read the code first and come back with a draft
(about 5-10 min), then we'll walk it together. Want that, or would you
rather start cold?" Only proceed if they opt in; otherwise fall back to
interview.md. - Read
bootstrap.mdand follow it end-to-end. Write<target-dir>/THREAT_MODEL.md. - Immediately continue into interview mode: read
interview.mdand follow it with--seed <target-dir>/THREAT_MODEL.mdin effect. The section 6 open questions from bootstrap become your Q1-Q4 prompts; the owner confirms, corrects, and adds rather than starting from nothing. - Overwrite
<target-dir>/THREAT_MODEL.mdwith the refined model. Set provenancemode: bootstrap-then-interview.
The same flow is available manually: run bootstrap first, then
interview --seed <THREAT_MODEL.md> in a later session.
Step 2 — Shared output contract
All modes MUST emit <target-dir>/THREAT_MODEL.md conforming to schema.md
in this directory. Read schema.md immediately before you write the file,
not at routing time; in interview mode the gap between routing and emit can be
many turns, and an early read will be evicted before it's used.
After writing the file, print to the user:
- The path to
THREAT_MODEL.md. - The top 5 threats by likelihood × impact (id, one-line description, L×I).
- For
bootstrap: any open questions the code could not answer (these seed a laterinterviewpass). - For
interview: any owner statements that could not be verified in code (these seed follow-up code review).
References
- docs/security.md and docs/prompting.md for the engagement-context and authorization framing this skill inherits.
Version History
- b5b61c8 Current 2026-07-05 18:37
