Activate a Table on Multi-Tenancy v2

Switch one table from v1 isolation (Hibernate @Filter on the entity) to v2 (SQL rewriting by TenantStatementInspector + the can_access_tenant function).

The reference implementation is the pilot, import_mappers, in PR #6255. Every template in this skill points to a real pilot file. Open it and copy the pattern; do not invent new mechanisms.

For the full mechanism (read path, write path, exact names), read the pilot PR #6255 description once before starting, plus the javadoc of TenantStatementInspector, TenantWriteScopeResolver and TenantScopeTransactionAspect.

If the table has a background writer (a scheduler job, queue consumer or startup task that writes it), read the background transaction primitive too: TenantScopedTransaction (openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/context/TenantScopedTransaction.java). The HTTP path carries its scope through @Transactional + TxCtx + the aspect; the background path must NOT use @Transactional (its self-invocation trap silently skips both the transaction and the scope) and opens transactions through the primitive instead. Phase 5b (this runbook's background-writer conversion phase, defined below between Phase 5 and the go-live) converts those writers; it is the prerequisite for activating any table a background job writes.

Inputs

• The table name (e.g. mitigations) and its API class (e.g. MitigationApi).
• The activation issue (e.g. #6400). Its Context block names the mapped table(s) and the current state.

Hard rules

These are not style preferences. Each one prevents a security or availability incident. Do not trade them away to make a test pass.

1. TDD, strictly. Write the isolation test first and run it. It must fail for the expected reason before you write any production code. Never weaken, delete or @Disabled an existing test to get green, with one exception introduced in Phase 2 and resolved in Phase 6 (the documented go-live guard).
2. Background writers go through the primitive, never @Transactional. A scheduler job, queue consumer, connector-side path or startup task that writes the table is NOT an automatic stop anymore (it was before #6398). It becomes activable ONCE every such writer is converted to TenantScopedTransaction (Phase 5b), carrying a real per-tenant scope. Until that conversion is done and tested, an unconverted background writer is still a hard blocker: activating the table under it would make the writer read and write zero rows, silently. ONE documented waiver exists: a writer that only INSERTs fresh rows (VALUES inserts are not blocked by the inspector), never READS the table, and attributes tenant_id correctly (listener + TenantContext, or explicit) may ship unconverted IF a test pins that write shape under activation AND the conversion is a tracked follow-up. The tenant-provisioning datapack writing cwes was the original example; it has since been converted (it now writes under the primitive scope MigrationProcessor sets), so no active waiver relies on this today. Use it only for a genuinely INSERT-only, never-reads writer you cannot convert in the same PR. A background READER, or any read-then-write path, gets no waiver. Background code must never use @Transactional for the write (self-invocation trap) and must never open raw transactions; both are guarded by the ArchUnit rules in openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/architecture/TenantBackgroundTransactionRules.java.
3. Strict tables only. If tenant_id is nullable (dual-scope: roles, groups, parameters, ...), STOP and report. Platform-row writes are an open policy question (Q7); this skill does not cover them.
4. One-commit go-live. Removing the v1 @Filter and adding the table to openaev.tenant.active-tables happen in the same commit, never split.
5. No hardcoded Flyway numbers. Refer to migrations by name. Never pin a version number in code comments, docs or tests.
6. Fail-closed is the point. If a query returns zero rows after wiring, the fix is to pass the scope correctly, never to bypass the inspector, never to add raw JDBC, never to widen the scope.
7. Full regression before done. The activation rewrites the SQL of every query touching the table. The full API suite must pass, not just your new tests.
8. Evidence over claims. Every red and every green leaves a trace: keep the raw test output (the failing assertion for the red, the passing summary for the green) and paste it into the Phase 8 report. A TDD step without its output did not happen.
9. Do not improvise on drift. If a model file referenced by this skill does not exist anymore, stop and find its successor (git log --oneline --follow --all -- <path>). Never substitute an invented pattern for a missing reference.

Procedure

Phase 0 — Eligibility gate (stop conditions)

Replace {table}, {Entity}, {EntityRepository}, {Api} below with your target (e.g. mitigations, Mitigation, MitigationRepository, MitigationApi).

# 0.1 The entity must be strict tenant-scoped: implements TenantBase, not DualScopeBase
grep -n "TenantBase\|DualScopeBase" openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model/{Entity}.java

# 0.2 The tenant column must be non-nullable. The entity mapping is the
# reliable static check; tenant_id was added to most tables by bulk
# migrations that loop over a table list, so grepping migrations for
# "{table}" + "tenant_id" on one line finds nothing.
grep -n -A2 'name = "tenant_id"' openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model/{Entity}.java
# expect: @JoinColumn(name = "tenant_id", ..., nullable = false)
# authoritative check when a DB is running:
#   SELECT is_nullable FROM information_schema.columns
#   WHERE table_name = '{table}' AND column_name = 'tenant_id';

# 0.3 Unique constraints must be tenant-aware. A global unique index on a
# business key (external id, name, key) means two tenants cannot hold the
# same value: activation would turn that into cross-tenant interference.
grep -rn -i "unique" openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/migration/ | grep -i "{table}"
# the grep misses multi-line definitions; on a live DB, `\d {table}` in psql
# lists every index and constraint and is authoritative

0.4 Hot-path check. The inspector wraps every active table in a filtered sub-query, which can change query plans. If the table sits in frequent joins or heavy list endpoints, look at the rewritten SQL before go-live: captured real SQL can be replayed through the inspector with openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/config/TenantSqlReplayMeasurementTest.java (gated by -Dtenant.sql.replay.file), and the heaviest query deserves an EXPLAIN with the rewrite applied. For a small config table this is a one-line note in the report; for a hot table it is a real measurement.

There is no reliable one-line grep for "no background writer" (a keyword filter on scheduler/job/consumer misses renamed packages and matches string literals). The authoritative classification is the Phase 1 inventory: read every hit.

STOP conditions, report instead of continuing:

• entity implements DualScopeBase, or the tenant column is nullable → dual-scope, out of scope (hard rule 3)
• Phase 1 finds any non-HTTP path that WRITES the table → NOT an automatic stop since #6398, but it moves the table into the background-writer track: every such writer must be converted to the primitive in Phase 5b before go-live. If the conversion is out of scope for this run (e.g. the writer is a large execution-surface job you are not converting now), STOP and report it as a blocker; the table cannot be activated while an unconverted writer touches it. A background READ-only hit (e.g. a telemetry counter) is not a blocker but must be listed in the report as a documented degradation: once the table is active it reads zero rows unless that reader also carries a scope.
• 0.3 finds a unique index on a business key that does not include tenant_id → the schema needs a prep migration first (model: the existing __Update_unique_constraints_for_tenants migration in openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/migration/; same pattern, new migration). CREATE UNIQUE INDEX mitigations_unique ON mitigations (mitigation_external_id), global, so two tenants cannot both hold MITRE mitigation M1013. Fix the constraint (add tenant_id to it) in its own reviewed change BEFORE the activation, and only if per-tenant duplication is the intended semantics; if the rows are meant to be platform-shared reference data, the table may not be a good activation candidate at all. Report and let a human decide.

When a stop condition is hit, still run Phase 1 (the inventory is what makes the stop useful), then produce a stop report instead of code and post it on the table's activation issue. Format:

## activate-tenant-table skill run: STOPPED at eligibility (gate <n>)

**Gates**
- 0.1 PASS/STOP: <entity check result>
- 0.2 PASS/STOP: <tenant column nullability>
- 0.3 PASS/STOP: <unique constraints; quote the offending index if any>
- 0.4: <hot-path note>

**Blocker to decide before activation**
<the failed gate, the options this skill lists for it, and what each option
needs (e.g. prep migration modeled on V4_82 vs shared-reference-data
discussion)>

**Inventory (phase 1)**
<repository users and their classification; child tables; other APIs>

**Side findings**
<anything found on the way that someone should look at, one line of impact each>

The evidence rule (hard rule 8) applies here too: quote the actual grep output or file lines behind each gate verdict, do not paraphrase them.

Phase 1 — Inventory every code path that touches the table

The table does not belong to one API. Any @Transactional path that reads it without a TxCtx gets no scope once the table is active, and no scope means zero rows, silently.

grep -rln "{EntityRepository}" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java
grep -rn "{table}" openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -v "^Binary"

The table-name grep matches string literals too (e.g. "apply mitigations" inside seeded CVE descriptions). Read each hit before classifying it; a textual match is not a code path.

Write down every hit and classify it:

• the table's own API and service → wired in Phases 3-4
• another API or service that reads the table → needs TxCtx too (Phase 5). The pilot found two: ScenarioImportApi and ExerciseImportApi both look up an import mapper.
• background reader → documented degradation (Phase 0), or give it a scope too (wrap its read in tenantTx.execute(scope, …)) if it must keep seeing rows
• background writer → convert to the primitive in Phase 5b. If you are not converting it in this run, it is a blocker: stop and report (Phase 0)

Walk the FULL transitive closure of callers, not just one hop. A single hop only finds direct callers of the repository. It misses the case where the repository sits behind a shared utility (InjectUtils.resolveInjector, CollectorService.getCollectorRelationsId, ...) that is itself called from several unrelated controllers through several unrelated services — each of those is a separate hop, and a one-hop walk stops at the first layer. This is exactly the gap that let injectors ship without AtomicTestingApi wired (#7026-class): the inventory found InjectorRepository used by InjectUtils.resolveInjector, walked one hop to its callers, and stopped at the ones already expected (InjectService, SimulationInjectApi) — a SECOND independent caller two hops away, AtomicTestingService.createOrUpdate (parallel implementation, not routed through InjectService), was never visited because nothing re-ran the caller-search on InjectUtils itself as a newly flagged symbol.

Treat this as a worklist/BFS over caller edges, not a fixed one-hop lookup:

# 1.0 Seed the worklist with every accessor method the repository exposes
#     that a caller could invoke to reach {table} (repository method names,
#     the entity's association accessors, and any shared utility already
#     found wrapping the repository, e.g. resolveInjector).
seeds=("findByInjectorId" "resolveInjector" "getConnectorRelationsId")  # adapt per table

visited=()
frontier=("${seeds[@]}")

while [ "${#frontier[@]}" -gt 0 ]; do
  next=()
  for symbol in "${frontier[@]}"; do
    # every call site of this symbol, anywhere in main code
    hits=$(grep -rln "\.${symbol}(\|${symbol}(" \
      openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java")
    for file in $hits; do
      # extract the enclosing method name(s) in this file that contain a call
      # to $symbol - read the file, do not trust this blindly, grep only
      # narrows candidates
      methods=$(grep -B40 "\.${symbol}(\|${symbol}(" "$file" \
        | grep -oE '(public|private|protected)[^(]*\s([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)\(' \
        | grep -oE '[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\(' | tail -1 | tr -d '(')
      for m in $methods; do
        if [[ ! " ${visited[*]} " =~ " ${m} " ]]; then
          visited+=("$m")
          next+=("$m")
        fi
      done
    done
  done
  frontier=("${next[@]}")
done
echo "Transitive callers found: ${visited[*]}"

This is a heuristic, not a real call graph (the enclosing-method extraction is approximate and multi-method files need manual review) — treat its output as candidates to READ, not as ground truth. If a proper call-hierarchy tool is available (an IDE's "Find Usages"/"Call Hierarchy", a language server, or a code-intelligence tool in this environment), prefer it over the grep worklist and use it recursively on every newly found method until the frontier is empty. The point is the STOPPING RULE, not the tool: stop only when every leaf in the closure is a real entrypoint (a @RequestMapping controller method, a @Scheduled/@RabbitListener background entrypoint, or a public API of a module you are not touching) — never stop at "a service I already expected to see," which is exactly the trap that hid AtomicTestingService.

Explicitly hunt for parallel/sibling implementations. The recurring pattern behind these misses is two independent services doing the same conceptual operation on the same entity: AtomicTestingService.createOrUpdate duplicates what InjectService does for scenario/simulation injects; AbstractConnectorService.getConnectorRelationsId has a near-identical sibling in CollectorService.getCollectorRelationsId. Neither grep (name nor one-hop caller) reliably surfaces the sibling, because they are different classes with different method names calling the same shared utility or repository. After the transitive closure above, explicitly search for other services that plausibly do the same kind of operation on the entity that owns {table}'s data (e.g. grep -rln "class.*Service" openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java" | xargs grep -l "{Entity}\b" and read each one, not just the one the greps already flagged) and confirm each either shares the wired code path or gets its own TxCtx. This is also where DEPRECATED controllers hide: the cwes activation had to wire CveApi (deprecated since 1.19, still deployed, same VulnerabilityService underneath) alongside VulnerabilityApi; neither grep sees it because it only references the service. A deprecated controller that still ships is a live path.

Walk shared gates up to every entrypoint, not just one hop. A helper method shared by several controllers (a launch gate, a mapper, a projection builder, ...) can have more callers than the ones you happened to notice. Stopping at the first caller is the #7188-class regression: the executors activation (#6409) found ExerciseService.throwIfExerciseNotLaunchable's callers updateExerciseStart and deprecatedUpdateExerciseStart and wired TxCtx on both, but ExerciseApi#changeExerciseStatus — a third, equally direct caller of the exact same gate — was never enumerated and shipped with the tenant-scope gap undetected. Every intermediate method found this way becomes its own grep target, repeated until every hit is a real entrypoint (@RestController method, @Scheduled/@RabbitListener, ...):

# for EVERY shared method discovered while walking up (not just the first one
# found) - repeat until the hit list is only entrypoints
grep -rn "\.{sharedMethodName}(" openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java"

When a shared gate has N callers, count them: N entrypoints in the inventory must produce N TxCtx additions (or N documented exceptions) — a gate found with only "the callers I happened to notice" is not a complete inventory.

Hunt every association accessor, whether or not the table has its own API. An association load (entity.get{Entities}()) bypasses the repository entirely, so neither the repository grep nor the table-name grep sees it. This applies in two shapes:

• the table has NO API of its own and is reached only through another aggregate's association (the cwes model: only Vulnerability's @ManyToMany reaches it);
• the table HAS its own API, but a separate, unrelated aggregate also holds an eager or lazy reference to it. Having an own API and being reached through another aggregate's association are independent facts — the executors table has ExecutorApi, yet Agent.getExecutor() (an EAGER @ManyToOne, read by EnterpriseEditionService.detectEEExecutors several calls away from any executor-specific code) was the exact path that broke.

Find every owning entity and every caller of its accessor, then confirm each caller either runs inside an already-scoped transaction or gets its own TxCtx:

# every entity field of type {Entity} (or a collection of it), anywhere in the model
grep -rln "private {Entity} \|private List<{Entity}>\|private Set<{Entity}>" openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java"
# then, for each owning entity found, every caller of its accessor
grep -rn "\.get{Entity}()\|\.get{Entities}()" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java"

Also list child tables (FKs pointing at {table}). A child without its own tenant_id rides along with the parent and is NOT added to active-tables. A child with its own tenant_id is a separate activation; report it.

Native query shape scan (#7007). Activating {table} does not just gate the queries that read {table} itself — it pulls into the fail-closed TenantStatementInspector rewrite EVERY native @Query that so much as mentions {table} in a JOIN, however unrelated to the rest of that query's predicates. TenantStatementInspector only accepts a closed list of FROM/JOIN shapes; anything else is refused with TENANT_FILTERING_REFUSED, even a shape that has nothing to do with tenant isolation. The #6751 (collectors) activation shipped this exact regression to production: adding collectors to active-tables pulled findAgentlessExpectationsNotFilledForSource into rewriting because it had JOIN collectors c, and its unrelated NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM jsonb_array_elements(...) r ...) predicate — a table-function FROM item without the LATERAL prefix — was refused fail-closed, breaking the AI defense collector endpoint on every call (see #7007 / PR #7008).

# every native @Query that JOINs {table}, anywhere in the codebase - not just
# the table's own repository
grep -rln "JOIN {table}\|join {table}" openaev-model/src/main/java openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java"

For every hit, read the FULL query text (not just the JOIN {table} line) and check every FROM/JOIN item against what TenantStatementInspector already accepts (see TenantStatementInspectorTest). The recurring offender is a table-function FROM item (jsonb_array_elements, jsonb_each, unnest, ...) missing LATERAL: LATERAL is a noise word for a function-call FROM item in PostgreSQL (identical semantics and plan) but is exactly the marker the inspector uses to accept it — add it. If the query uses a FROM/JOIN shape the inspector does not cover at all, that is a blocker: stop and report (Phase 0), do not attempt to teach the inspector a new shape inside a table-activation PR.

Pin the fix with a regression test in TenantStatementInspectorTest using the REAL production SQL (read the @Query value via reflection off the repository method, as PR #7008 does), not a hand-simplified paraphrase — the whole point is to catch the exact shape that broke in production. Also note for the record: openaev-api/src/test/resources/application.properties ships an EMPTY openaev.tenant.active-tables, so IntegrationTest-based API tests never exercise the rewriter for {table} and cannot catch this class of regression — TenantStatementInspectorTest (constructed directly with {table} in its active-table set) is the only test layer that does.

Test compatibility scan. Adding a TxCtx parameter to an endpoint breaks tests that the repository grep misses. Three failure modes exist:

1. A standaloneSetup or @WebMvcTest MockMvc test hitting the URL → 500 (No primary or single unique constructor found for interface TxCtx) because the test has no TxCtxArgumentResolver.
2. A test calling the controller method directly in Java → compile error (missing argument).
3. A test relying on the v1 @Filter you remove at go-live: any test that calls session.enableFilter("tenantFilter") (or otherwise counts on implicit filtering) and then asserts a findAll()-style read on the entity silently changes meaning — once the filter is gone and the test context keeps the allowlist empty, the read returns EVERY tenant's rows. Found on the cwes activation: TenantServiceTest expected 7 cwes and saw 14. Fix by asserting on explicit attribution instead (.filteredOn(e -> tenantId.equals(e.getTenant().getId()))), never by re-adding the filter.

Scan for all three:

# 1.1 standaloneSetup tests that hit the API's URL patterns
grep -rln "standaloneSetup" openaev-api/src/test/java | xargs grep -l "{Api}\|/{entities}"

# 1.2 direct Java calls to the API class
grep -rn "{Api}" openaev-api/src/test/java --include="*.java"

# 1.3 tests relying on the v1 filter over the entity you are activating
grep -rln 'enableFilter("tenantFilter")' openaev-api/src/test/java | xargs grep -l "{EntityRepository}\|{Entity}"

Fix: register the resolver on the standalone builder (.setCustomArgumentResolvers(new TxCtxTestArgumentResolver(...))) or migrate to the full-context IntegrationTest base class; add the TxCtx arg to direct calls. List every affected test file in the inventory.

Phase 2 — RED: write the HTTP isolation test first

Model: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/mapper/ImportMapperHttpIsolationTest.java. If the table has NO API of its own and is reached through another aggregate's association, prove isolation through THAT aggregate's real endpoints instead; model: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/vulnerability/CweHttpIsolationTest.java (cwes proven through the vulnerability endpoints: own-path read exposes the row, cross-tenant read sees an empty association, ground truth by raw JDBC). Such a test cannot be @Transactional when it must touch two tenant paths: each request needs its own transaction (see the model's javadoc). Everything it creates is therefore COMMITTED: clean the table rows explicitly in @AfterEach, then remove the tenants with TenantIsolationTestHelper#deleteCommittedTenants (null-safe, handles the one non-cascading tenant child). Place the new test next to the API under test (openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/{domain}/). Copy the model's structure. Key elements that must all be present:

@Transactional
@TestPropertySource(properties = "openaev.tenant.active-tables={table}")
@WithMockUser(isAdmin = true)
class {Entity}HttpIsolationTest extends IntegrationTest {

  @Autowired private MockMvc mvc;
  @Autowired private TenantIsolationTestHelper tenantHelper;

  @BeforeEach
  void seedTwoTenantsWithOneRowEach() throws Exception {
    tenantA = tenantHelper.createTenantWithCurrentUser("http-iso-a").getId();
    tenantB = tenantHelper.createTenantWithCurrentUser("http-iso-b").getId();
    // seed one row per tenant with a native INSERT carrying an explicit tenant_id
  }
}

Notes that make or break the test:

• @TestPropertySource activates the table for this test only. The test classpath keeps the allowlist empty on purpose; never add your table to the test-wide properties.
• Seed with a native INSERT ... VALUES including tenant_id, like the pilot's seedMapper. The inspector does not block VALUES inserts.
• Ground-truth assertions (prove a row was NOT touched) use raw JDBC on the test's own connection, like the pilot's rawName/rawCount helpers, with an entityManager.flush() first.
• Each test method stays on ONE tenant path. Changing the scope inside the same transaction is refused by the nesting guard in TenantScopeTransactionAspect.

Cover, one test method each (match your API's real endpoints):

• read own row under own path → 200; other tenant's row under your path → 404
• list/search under a path, and via the X-Tenant-Ids header → only that tenant's rows
• create under a tenant path → row stored with that tenant_id (assert with a native query); create with no selector → 400
• update and delete cross-tenant → 404 or no-op, ground-truth read proves the row is untouched
• import/duplicate/export where the API has them
• upsert where the API has one: upserting the same business key under two different tenant paths must yield two distinct rows, each with its own tenant_id. This test only passes if the unique constraints are tenant-aware (Phase 0.3); a unique-violation failure here means that gate was skipped.
• find-or-create by business key (Phase 4's trap): with the key existing in BOTH tenants, a request under a MULTI-tenant scope (plain path, caller in two tenants) must be refused with 400 — never 500 on the duplicate, never a silent link to another tenant's row. And under one tenant's path, a second write with the same key must REUSE that tenant's row, not duplicate it. Models: plainPathWithCweIsRefusedUnderMultiTenantScope and sameTenantCweIsReusedNotDuplicated in CweHttpIsolationTest.

Run it and check the failure reasons:

mvn -ntp -pl openaev-api test -Dtest='{Entity}HttpIsolationTest'

Expected RED: reads under a tenant path fail (no TxCtx on the handler yet, so no scope, so zero rows) and write attribution fails (no resolver yet). If a test fails for a different reason (compile error, fixture problem), fix that first; the red must be the mechanism, not noise.

Save the raw output now: the failing assertions are the red evidence that goes into the Phase 8 report (hard rule 8).

The header-route list test will stay red even after wiring, while the v1 @Filter is still on the entity: v1's thread-local predicate ANDs with v2's and returns nothing. @Disabled that one test with a comment saying exactly that, referencing the go-live phase. This is the ONE allowed @Disabled, and Phase 6 removes it.

Phase 3 — GREEN: wire TxCtx on the table's own API (reads)

Model: openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/rest/mapper/MapperApi.java.

• Map the controller on both URIs: @RequestMapping({{Api}.URI, {Api}.TENANT_URI}) with TENANT_URI = TenantUriUtils.TENANT_PREFIX + "/...".
• Add a TxCtx ctx parameter to every handler whose transaction reads or writes the table. The handler body does not use it; the transaction aspect does. Copy the pilot's one-line comment explaining that, so a reviewer does not delete the "unused" parameter.
• The aspect only fires on @Transactional methods. If a handler is not @Transactional, make it so; a TxCtx parameter without the annotation is silently ignored and the endpoint stays fail-closed.
• A handler that provably never touches the table (works on other tables, or on transient objects never persisted) does not need one. When in doubt, wire it.

Re-run the test class after each endpoint. Read tests go green one by one. Do not move to writes until all reads are green.

Phase 3b — Every direct or indirect link to the table, everywhere

Phase 1 finds code that reads {table} through {EntityRepository} or a literal string match. It does NOT reliably find another aggregate's association pointing at {Entity} (@OneToMany, @ManyToMany, @ManyToOne) that some UNRELATED API lazy-loads and serializes — that association never mentions {table} or {EntityRepository} by name, so neither Phase 1 grep sees it. This is exactly what #7026 shipped to production for the collectors activation, months after go-live: model it.

Root cause of #7026, read it before running this phase — it is the failure mode you are hunting for: security_platform_collectors was always serialized as an empty array because SecurityPlatform#collectors is a lazy association, serialized by MultiIdListSerializer AFTER the controller's @Transactional method returned (open-in-view). By then TenantScopeTransactionAspect's scope was gone. SecurityPlatformApi's endpoints carried no TxCtx at all (nobody had reason to add one — that API does not read collectors directly, it reads SecurityPlatform), so app.current_tenants was never set, and the fail-closed TenantStatementInspector rewrote the lazy collectors query to can_access_tenant(...) = false for every row. The endpoint kept returning 200 with an empty list, not an error — so nothing failed loudly, and CI never saw it either: the test profile ships an EMPTY active-tables, so the inspector never fires (the same gap #7007 already names). The frontend then silently mis-derived isCollectorManaged() from that empty array and unlocked Update/Delete on a platform whose collector was still running.

This phase runs at go-live AND belongs in the permanent Definition of Done for every activation, not just once: a NEW association to {Entity} can be added by an unrelated PR at any time after {table} is already active, and nothing today stops it from shipping unscoped. Re-run this phase's greps whenever a new @OneToMany/@ManyToMany/@ManyToOne targeting {Entity} appears in review (the {table} entry in TenantActiveTableAccessArchTest from Phase 6 is what makes a future miss fail the build instead of shipping silently).

3b.1 — find every association pointing at the entity, anywhere, not just its own aggregate:

# every field typed as {Entity} or a collection of it, in ANY entity
grep -rn "{Entity}>\|{Entity} " openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model --include="*.java" | grep -i "@OneToMany\|@ManyToMany\|@ManyToOne\|@OneToOne" -A1 -B1
# faster two-step: list the annotation lines, then check the next line's type
grep -rln "@OneToMany\|@ManyToMany\|@ManyToOne\|@OneToOne" openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model --include="*.java" \
  | xargs grep -B1 -n "{Entity}" 

Read every hit's owning entity ({OwningEntity}), not just {Entity} itself — the collectors bug lived on SecurityPlatform, an entity that has nothing else to do with the collectors activation.

3b.2 — for every {OwningEntity} found, find every accessor call across the whole codebase, including serialization:

grep -rn "\.get{Entities}()\|\.get{Entity}()" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java"

Classify each call site:

• inside an explicit query (JOIN FETCH, a @Query projecting the association) → already eagerly resolved inside the query's own transaction; check that query's controller/service carries TxCtx (same rule as Phase 1/5).
• a lazy getter called directly in a @Transactional method body → resolves inside that transaction; the CALLER method needs TxCtx (Phase 5 if it is not the table's own API).
• a lazy getter reached ONLY through JSON serialization (a custom serializer like MultiIdListSerializer, a DTO mapper invoked by Jackson, a @JsonSerialize field) → the dangerous case. With open-in-view or any serialization step that runs after the controller method returns, the association resolves OUTSIDE the transaction the aspect scoped. Fix per the #7026 pattern: force-initialize the association INSIDE the scoped transaction, before the method returns, with a documented helper (Hibernate.initialize(owning.get{Entities}()), or eager-fetch it in the query that loaded {OwningEntity}), and make sure that controller method itself carries TxCtx — a lazy association resolved eagerly under no scope still reads zero rows. Model: SecurityPlatformApi's withCollectorsInitialized helper (PR #7026).
• no controller ever serializes it, only used inside a background job → treat as Phase 5b (background reader), not this phase.

3b.3 — pin every fixed accessor with an ArchUnit rule and a scoped test:

• Add every {OwningEntity}#get{Entities} caller found above to the association-accessor allowlist rule in TenantActiveTableAccessArchTest (same rule described in Phase 6, step 5), even for {OwningEntity}s that are not the table's own aggregate. A new, un-allowlisted caller must fail the build.
• Add every serializing entrypoint from 3b.2 to TenantScopedEntrypointsTxCtxArchTest (TX_SCOPED_ENTRYPOINTS), same as any other TxCtx-bearing entrypoint.
• Write one test per fixed entrypoint, modeled on SecurityPlatformCollectorsTenantScopeTest (PR #7026): run with @TestPropertySource(properties = "openaev.tenant.active-tables={table}") (production-like, inspector active — the default test profile's empty allowlist is exactly what let #7026 through) and assert the association serializes the live link for an in-scope row, and comes back empty only once the linked {Entity} row is genuinely gone (not merely out-of-scope).

Do not defer this phase to "later regression pass" — an association missed here degrades silently (200 OK, empty array) exactly like #7026, so nothing in Phase 8's regression run will catch it unless the new test from 3b.3 exists.

Phase 4 — RED then GREEN: write attribution

The inspector cannot attribute INSERT ... VALUES. Attribution is application code, and it is the part most often forgotten.

Model: createImportMapper and importMappers in MapperApi.java, plus MapperService.createAndSaveImportMapper in openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/service/MapperService.java.

On every create/import endpoint:

String tenantId = writeScopeResolver.tenantForWrite(ctx, null);

and in the service, stamp the entity before save:

entity.setTenant(new Tenant(tenantId));

Rules enforced by TenantWriteScopeResolver (do not reimplement them, inject the component): single-tenant scope → that tenant; supplied tenant outside scope → 400; multi-tenant scope without selector → 400.

An upsert (or any find-or-create by business key) is both paths at once, and it hides the nastiest trap of an activation. Do NOT look the row up by the bare business key under the request scope: after activation the unique key is per-tenant (business_key, tenant_id), so under a MULTI-tenant read scope the lookup can match one row per in-scope tenant. Concretely it either crashes (IncorrectResultSizeDataAccessException on the Optional) or, when a single in-scope tenant owns the key, silently links ANOTHER tenant's row to your write. The per-tenant preset data makes duplicated business keys the NORMAL case, not an edge. The correct order, proven on the cwes activation:

1. Resolve the write tenant FIRST: tenantForWrite(ctx, null) (an ambiguous multi-tenant scope is refused with 400, loudly, before any lookup).
2. Look up by the per-tenant unique key: a repository method findBy{BusinessKey}AndTenantId(key, writeTenant) (model: CweRepository#findByExternalIdAndTenantId, used by VulnerabilityService#updateCweAssociations).
3. The insert branch stamps the entity with that same write tenant.

The update branch needs nothing extra; the inspector already refuses to touch a row outside the scope.

The plumbing also offers @RequireTenantSelector (400 when the request carries no explicit selector, see openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/config/RequireTenantSelector.java). The pilot does not use it: the resolver's single-tenant rule already refuses ambiguous writes. Do not add it unless the endpoint must refuse even an implicit single-tenant scope.

Do NOT keep TenantBaseListener / TenantIdBaseListener on the entity. It is a v1 pattern that reads from TenantContext — which is no longer the source of truth for activated tables. Write attribution is now explicit via the resolver; any test that relied on the listener auto-populating tenant must be fixed to set tenantId explicitly. Keeping the listener creates a hidden fallback path that masks missing write attribution and blocks the eventual removal of TenantContext from the codebase.

Write-path completeness check — before removing the listener, audit every persist call on the entity:

# 4.1 Find every save/persist of the entity
grep -rn "{EntityRepository}\.\(save\|saveAll\|saveAndFlush\)\|persist({entity}\|merge({entity}" \
  openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java"

# 4.2 For each hit, confirm one of:
#   (a) it calls writeScopeResolver.tenantForWrite(ctx, ...) and stamps the entity
#       with setTenant(new Tenant(tenantId)) BEFORE the save — a CREATE path
#   (b) it is an UPDATE-only path (the row already exists with tenant_id set;
#       the inspector scopes the statement, no re-attribution needed)
#   (c) it is a background writer covered by Phase 5b (stamped inside a
#       forEachTenant or execute(forTenant(id), ...) scope)

Any save that creates a new entity without explicit tenant attribution is a silent data corruption once the listener is removed — tenant_id will be NULL. Fix it (add tenantForWrite + setTenant) before proceeding to go-live. This check catches paths that the Phase 1 inventory (which greps for readers) and the Phase 2 isolation test (which covers the main API only) can miss: services shared by multiple controllers, internal helpers, bulk importers.

Re-run: create/import/upsert tests green, including "no selector → 400".

Phase 5 — Other paths from the inventory

For every other API or service found in Phase 1 that reads the table:

• add a TxCtx parameter on its @Transactional entrypoint
• add an isolation test proving the cross-tenant case through that path. Models: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/scenario/ScenarioImportApiTenantIsolationTest.java and openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/exercise/ExerciseImportApiTenantIsolationTest.java.

Then add the non-admin proof. Model: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/rest/mapper/ImportMapperNonAdminIsolationTest.java (@WithMockUser(isAdmin = false), tenants seeded with tenantHelper.createTenantWithCapabilities(...)). Isolation must hold without the admin flag.

Do NOT re-prove the out-of-rights selector refusal (403): that is shared plumbing, already covered by openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/config/TenantSelectorMembershipTest.java.

Finally, register every new TxCtx-bearing entrypoint in openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/architecture/TenantScopedEntrypointsTxCtxArchTest.java (add "{package}.{Api}#methodName" entries to TX_SCOPED_ENTRYPOINTS), then run it:

mvn -ntp -pl openaev-api test -Dtest='TenantScopedEntrypointsTxCtxArchTest,TenantNonOrmAccessArchTest'

Phase 5b — Background writers: convert to the primitive

Skip this phase only if Phase 1 found NO background path that touches the table. Otherwise every background writer (and every background reader that must keep seeing rows) is converted here, BEFORE go-live: once the table is in active-tables, an unconverted background path reads and writes zero rows, silently.

Model conversion: UrlAccessTokenPurgeJob (openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/scheduler/jobs/UrlAccessTokenPurgeJob.java), converted to tenantTx.execute(TxCtx.allTenants(), …) in PR #6398. Injected dependency: TenantScopedTransaction tenantTx.

Maturity note: the background path is newer and less proven than the HTTP path. At the time of writing, the only converted job is UrlAccessTokenPurgeJob, which uses allTenants(); the per-tenant forEachTenant idiom has no production caller yet (it is covered by integration tests, not by a real job). Treat the first per-tenant conversion as a real dress rehearsal, not a copy-paste, and expand the model list as jobs are converted.

Enumerate every background path first. Phase 1's greps are repository- and table-name-oriented and can miss a background surface. There is no single reliable grep, so sweep several and READ each hit:

# scheduled work and startup tasks
grep -rn "@Scheduled\|implements Job\|extends QuartzJobBean\|ApplicationRunner\|CommandLineRunner\|@PostConstruct" \
  openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/scheduler openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"
# queue / broker consumers
grep -rn "@RabbitListener\|@KafkaListener\|MessageListener\|consume\|@EventListener" \
  openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"
# then, for each candidate job/consumer class, check whether it reaches the repository
grep -rln "{EntityRepository}\|{Entity}Service" openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/scheduler --include="*.java"

A background path that WRITES the table and is not converted here is a go-live blocker (hard rule 2). List every background hit in the Phase 9 report with its scope choice or its blocker reason.

Rules for the background write path (all guarded by the ArchUnit rules in TenantBackgroundTransactionRules.java, enforced frozen by TenantBackgroundTransactionArchTest.java):

• No @Transactional on the background write. Its self-invocation trap skips both the transaction and the scope with no error. Open the transaction with the primitive instead.
• No raw transaction plumbing in jobs (TransactionTemplate, PlatformTransactionManager, manual getTransaction/commit). The primitive is the one door.
• Never catch-and-continue inside a single transaction. Any runtime exception from a joined @Transactional service marks the whole transaction rollback-only; carrying on dies at commit (UnexpectedRollbackException). Recover around a boundary, not inside one.

Choose the scope by what the job does:

A row insert cannot be attributed under allTenants(): a new row belongs to exactly one tenant, and TenantWriteScopeResolver.tenantForWrite refuses the intention (TenantWriteScopeException). So a job that INSERTS per-tenant rows uses forEachTenant (or execute(forTenant(id), …)), never allTenants(). allTenants() fits a bulk read, or a bulk delete/update BY PREDICATE: those never call tenantForWrite, the inspector simply scopes the statement to the resolved tenant list, so no per-row attribution is needed. The UrlAccessTokenPurgeJob model is exactly such a bulk delete under allTenants(), not a read.

Native and raw SQL — the background-job trap. Background jobs lean on hand-optimized SQL more than HTTP code (queries rewritten as native to dodge ORM inefficiency). The two forms behave very differently once the table is active:

• Native through Hibernate (@Query(nativeQuery = true), entityManager.createNativeQuery(...)) DOES pass through the statement inspector: it is a Hibernate StatementInspector, so it sees this SQL and scopes it. The risk is not a leak, it is availability: the inspector is fail-closed, so a shape it cannot parse or rewrite (a multi-target DELETE, a target-side-join UPDATE, an exotic FROM, an unusual statement) throws TenantFilteringException and the query BREAKS once the table is active. Hand-optimized job queries (CTEs, window functions, unusual joins) are exactly the shapes most likely to hit "not yet covered". Every native query on the table used by a background path must therefore be EXERCISED by a test (the Phase 5b isolation test or the regression suite) so a rewrite failure surfaces in CI, not in production. If the inspector refuses a query, rewrite it into a covered shape or postpone the activation; never bypass the inspector.
• Raw JDBC (JdbcTemplate, NamedParameterJdbcOperations, a direct Connection/Statement) BYPASSES Hibernate entirely, so the inspector never sees it: a silent cross-tenant read and an unattributed write. This is already guarded by TenantNonOrmAccessArchTest (no_raw_jdbc_outside_the_allowlist), which fails the build on any new raw JDBC in production code outside the audited @AllowRawJdbc allowlist (which covers non-tenant tables, plus the two narrow test-enforced exceptions below). A raw-JDBC path touching the table you are activating is a HARD BLOCKER: convert it to go through Hibernate (so it gets inspected) before go-live. Never @AllowRawJdbc a tenant table to make a job compile.
• Narrow exception — a provably insert-only bypass. The rule above is deliberately blunt: it cannot tell an INSERT ... VALUES-only path (which the inspector would not scope anyway, since tenant assignment on a VALUES insert stays an application concern) from a read/update bypass (which silently reads or writes across tenants). A raw-JDBC path may keep @AllowRawJdbc on a tenant table ONLY when all three hold: it emits nothing but INSERT, every insert carries tenant_id as an explicit column, and a test enforces both on every build so the exemption cannot silently widen. The seed generator for the attack-path tables is the reference (AttackPathSeedServiceTest). Absent that enforced insert-only proof, the HARD BLOCKER stands.
• Narrow exception — a provably read-only scope-bootstrap lookup. Deriving a service-identity scope FROM a row (an orchestrator callback scoped by its parent run's own tenant) is a chicken-and-egg: the read that decides the scope cannot run under the scope it is deciding, and the inspector would fail-close it. A raw-JDBC path may keep @AllowRawJdbc for that bootstrap ONLY when all three hold: it emits nothing but a single-row SELECT of the row's own immutable tenant_id addressed by primary key, it projects no other column, and a test pins the bypass class list and the exact statement on every build so the exemption cannot silently widen. The bootstrap read must also respect tenant liveness (filter on tenant_deleted_at IS NULL): a soft-deleted tenant is excluded from every caller scope for its whole grace period, so a row-derived scope that ignored the flag would quietly re-admit a tenant no caller can reach. The autonomous-run callback locator is the reference (AutonomousRunTenantLocator / AutonomousRunTenantLocatorTest). Absent that enforced read-only proof, the HARD BLOCKER stands.

Add a grep for both to the inventory and read each hit:

grep -rn "nativeQuery *= *true\|createNativeQuery" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"
grep -rn "JdbcTemplate\|NamedParameterJdbc\|getConnection\|@AllowRawJdbc" openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"

Write attribution is the same as HTTP. Inside the scope, resolve and stamp:

String tenantId = writeScopeResolver.tenantForWrite(ctx, null);
entity.setTenant(new Tenant(tenantId));

Under forEachTenant each iteration carries a single-tenant scope, so attribution resolves cleanly per tenant.

Nesting. If the converted job joins a @Transactional service that carries a NARROWER TxCtx, the aspect's nesting guard refuses it and poisons the transaction. Open the narrower scope with executeNew from the start, never by narrowing inside the same transaction.

RED first, then GREEN — the background isolation test. Model: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/context/TenantScopedTransactionIntegrationTest.java (single scope) and openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/context/TenantScopeAllTenantsIntegrationTest.java (allTenants() and forEachTenant, including the per-tenant rollback proof). Key differences from the HTTP test:

• The test class is NOT @Transactional. The primitive's execute refuses to open inside an active transaction, so seed and clean through auto-committed JdbcTemplate, not a rolled-back test transaction.
• Activate the table with @TestPropertySource(properties = "openaev.tenant.active-tables={table}"), same as the HTTP test.
• Prove: the converted job under its scope sees and writes only the in-scope tenant's rows; a cross-tenant row is invisible; for a per-tenant loop, one tenant's failure is rolled back on its own and does not poison the others.

Run it red, wire the conversion, run it green, keep both outputs (hard rule 8):

mvn -ntp -pl openaev-api test -Dtest='{Entity}BackgroundIsolationTest'

ArchUnit baseline. Converting a writer that currently sits on the frozen background baseline (a @Transactional job, a raw-template job) SOLVES recorded violations — and that FAILS the locked build: FreezingArchRule removes solved violations from the store, which is a store write, and under freeze.store.default.allowStoreUpdate=false the write throws StoreUpdateFailedException (verified in ArchUnit 1.4.2). The conversion PR must therefore include a deliberate store refresh; the full procedure (triage, fix patterns, tests, re-freeze commands) is its own runbook: .github/skills/reduce-tx-baseline/SKILL.md. Never hand-edit the store files.

Known limits of the background path — name them in the report, do not paper over them:

• No runtime scope guarantee for background writers. The HTTP side is pinned by TenantScopedEntrypointsTxCtxArchTest, which fails the build if an active table's handler loses its TxCtx. There is NO background analogue yet: a NEW job that writes an already-active table without going through the primitive would read and write zero rows with no failing test. The existing rules forbid the wrong SHAPE (@Transactional, raw plumbing, raw JDBC) but do not assert that every writer of an active table carries a real scope. Until that guard exists, converting a table's writers is a point-in-time fact, not an invariant — say so in the report.
• The per-tenant loop is serial and single-threaded, one transaction per tenant. For a job over thousands of tenants, watch total runtime against the job's window (@DisallowConcurrentExecution means an overrun skips the next fire). The loop itself provides no batching or parallelism, but parallel per-tenant work is NOT a workaround: a job with its own executor opens one transaction per task (see the scope table above), and concurrent scoped transactions are proven isolated by test, for reads and writes. Size such an executor against the connection pool: each concurrent task holds one pooled connection for its whole transaction, and an oversized fan-out starves the HTTP path. A nested executeNew holds two. When the converted write is not a top-level job but a hook inside an already-transactional caller (e.g. a per-inject write from the run flow), executeNew opens a second, REQUIRES_NEW transaction, so that task holds two pooled connections at once for the duration of the inner write. Concurrency is then bounded by pool_size / 2, not pool_size, and K parallel callers each demanding their second connection at once can deadlock on the pool until the Hikari timeout. Size the caller's concurrency against half the pool, or keep the inner write short so the second connection is held briefly. And await every task before the job method returns: a fire-and-forget job defeats @DisallowConcurrentExecution, so the next fire could open a second transaction on the SAME tenant. If the SEQUENTIAL loop's runtime becomes the concern, raise it rather than hand-rolling a second loop idiom.
• Partial failure is visible only in logs. forEachTenant runs every tenant and throws one aggregate at the end, so the job is marked failed even when most tenants succeeded. Operators see "failed"; the per-tenant log.warn and the aggregate's suppressed causes carry what actually happened. A success/failure summary metric is a follow-up, not part of the primitive.

Phase 6 — Go-live: ONE commit

Model (from PR #6255): commit "feat(multi-tenancy): activate import_mappers on v2 isolation (#6212)" (find it with git log --oneline --grep "activate import_mappers on v2 isolation"). Four changes, together, nothing else:

1. Remove @Filter(name = "tenantFilter", ...) and remove the TenantBaseListener.class (or TenantIdBaseListener.class) from @EntityListeners in openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model/{Entity}.java. Replace it with a javadoc comment stating the table is fully on v2 and why the v1 filter and listener must not come back. Fix any test that relied on the listener to auto-populate tenantId — set it explicitly instead.
2. Append {table} to openaev.tenant.active-tables in openaev-api/src/main/resources/application.properties (comma-separated, keep existing entries).
3. Re-enable the one @Disabled header-route test from Phase 2.
4. Extend the production-config guard so dropping the table from the allowlist fails the build. Model: openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/config/ImportMapperActivationConfigTest.java. Prefer extending a shared guard over cloning the file; the assertion must name {table} explicitly.
5. Extend the access guard (openaev-api/src/test/java/io/openaev/architecture/TenantActiveTableAccessArchTest.java): add {table} to GUARDED_TABLES, a repository rule allowlisting the Phase 1 inventory (each entry commented with its scope mechanism), and an association-accessor rule for every entity accessor that lazy-loads the table from another aggregate (the cwes model: Vulnerability#getCwes). The guard's completeness check fails the build if the table is activated without this step — that is deliberate.

If anything in this phase needs "just one more fix" in production code, stop and go back to the phase that owns that fix. The go-live diff stays minimal.

Rollback story, decide it now, not during an incident: if production misbehaves after go-live, revert the WHOLE go-live commit (the @Filter comes back in the same change that removes the allowlist entry). Never remove just the property: with the @Filter gone that is an isolation hole, and the config guard fails the build precisely to stop that move.

Parallel activations: other tables go live through the same application.properties line and the same TX_SCOPED_ENTRYPOINTS set. Rebase right before go-live and re-read the merged allowlist line; a bad merge that drops another table's entry is what the shared config guard catches, do not rely on it alone.

Phase 7 — v1 remnant audit

Before running the regression suite, audit the full call stack of every public method on {Api} (and on the other APIs from Phase 5) for v1 isolation patterns that conflict with or duplicate the v2 mechanism.

What to search for:

1. TenantContext.getCurrentTenant() — the v1 thread-local tenant. Any call in the controller, service, repository, or specification layer that touches {table} is a v1 remnant. The v2 inspector handles scoping; the thread-local is no longer the source of truth for activated tables.
2. findByIdAndTenantId or any repository method that explicitly filters by tenant_id on {table} — redundant and restrictive. The inspector already scopes reads; an explicit AND tenant_id = ? prevents multi-tenant queries that v2 intentionally supports.
3. TenantBaseListener on @EntityListeners of the entity — if write attribution is now explicit via TenantWriteScopeResolver, the listener is dead code for this entity and should be removed to avoid a hidden fallback to TenantContext.
4. // TODO v2: markers anywhere in the codebase naming {table} — a previous activation or bugfix may have left an explicit tenant-scoping workaround (an extra tenantId parameter on a native query, a manual filter, a duplicated lookup) specifically BECAUSE {table} (or an entity it joins) was still on v1, with a comment pointing at this table's activation issue as the trigger to remove it. This is the ONLY mechanism that carries such a workaround forward from one activation to the next — the skill's own Phase 7 audit is scoped to the table being activated NOW and does not revisit it later, so a workaround left on another table's query is invisible to this phase unless it is grepped for explicitly. Model: the tenantId param added to ConnectorInstanceConfigurationRepository.findInstanceAndCatalogIdsByKeyValueAndTenantId (issue #6408 for connector_instances) — a native query joining connector_instances had to carry the tenant predicate by hand because the join target was still v1; once connector_instances activates, the inspector scopes that join automatically and the parameter becomes removable.

How to search:

# 7.1 Direct usage in the API package and its services
grep -rn "TenantContext.getCurrentTenant\|findByIdAndTenantId\|findByTenantId" \
  openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/rest/{domain}/ \
  openaev-api/src/main/java/io/openaev/service/ \
  --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"

# 7.2 Repository-level tenant filtering on the activated table
grep -rn "TenantId\|tenant_id\|tenantId" \
  openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/repository/{EntityRepository}.java \
  openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/specification/*{Entity}*.java

# 7.3 Deep stack: check services called by the API methods
grep -rn "TenantContext" \
  $(grep -rln "{EntityRepository}\|{Entity}Service" openaev-api/src/main/java --include="*.java")

# 7.4 TenantBaseListener still on entity
grep -n "TenantBaseListener" \
  openaev-model/src/main/java/io/openaev/database/model/{Entity}.java

# 7.5 codebase-wide: workarounds left for THIS table's activation, wherever
# they live (may be on a repository/service far from {table}'s own package)
grep -rln "// TODO v2:" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java" \
  | xargs grep -l "{table}\|{Entity}\|{table_or_entity}"

Classification and action:

Output: audit report

Produce a table listing every hit, its file and line, whether it targets the activated table, and the action taken (removed / reported-only). Include it in the Phase 9 report. Hits on other tables are informational — they document the v1 surface that remains for future activations.

When THIS activation itself introduces a new explicit tenant-scoping workaround on a query that joins a still-v1 table (the mirror image of 7.5 — you are now the one leaving a marker for someone else's future activation), leave a // TODO v2: once {other_table} get v2 activated <issue-url>, <what to remove> comment on that workaround so the eventual {other_table} activation finds it via its own Phase 7.5 grep.

Phase 8 — Full regression pass

# 8.1 re-run the inventory greps: a reader, a background path, a native or raw
# query added while you worked ships broken (or unscoped)
grep -rln "{EntityRepository}" openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java
grep -rn "nativeQuery *= *true\|createNativeQuery\|JdbcTemplate\|NamedParameterJdbc" \
  openaev-api/src/main/java openaev-model/src/main/java --include="*.java" | grep -i "{table_or_entity}"

# 8.2 format and compile
mvn -B -ntp spotless:check || mvn -ntp spotless:apply
mvn -ntp clean install -DskipTests

# 8.3 your tests, then the FULL API suite (needs the Docker services from
# openaev-dev/docker-compose.yml: PostgreSQL, MinIO, OpenSearch, RabbitMQ)
mvn -ntp -pl openaev-api test -Dtest='{Entity}*IsolationTest'

Any pre-existing test that now fails is signal, not noise: it is a query on your table that lost its scope. Fix it by passing TxCtx, never by deactivating the table or weakening the test.

Phase 9 — Report

Before marking the issue done, write down:

• the red and green evidence: the raw failing assertions from Phase 2 and the final passing summary from Phase 8 (hard rule 8)
• the endpoints wired and the arch-test entries added
• the background writers converted (Phase 5b): each one, its scope choice (forEachTenant / forTenant / allTenants) and the reason, and its isolation test
• the v1 remnant audit table from Phase 7 (hits found, actions taken, reported-only items)
• every direct or indirect association to the entity found in Phase 3b: its owning entity, whether it was lazy-loaded outside the transaction (the #7026 shape) or already safe, the fix applied, and its scoped test
• background readers left degraded (from Phase 0/1), each with a one-line impact
• child tables and how they are covered
• client impact: writes now require a single-tenant scope. Calls using the tenant path (/api/tenants/{tenantId}/...) already satisfy this; callers using the header route or no selector may get 400 on create/import until they switch to a single-tenant selector.

Definition of Done

• Phase 0 gates passed (strict table; background writers either converted in Phase 5b or reported as blockers), stop conditions reported if hit
• unique constraints on business keys include tenant_id, or a prep migration was done first (own reviewed change)
• inventory complete; every reader classified; redone before go-live
• call graph walked to every @RestController entrypoint (not one hop): for each shared gate/helper method found along the way, its full caller list was grepped and the count of TxCtx additions matches the count of callers found (#6409 regression: changeExerciseStatus was a third, unwired caller of throwIfExerciseNotLaunchable missed this way)
• association-accessor scan run for every entity holding a reference to the activated entity, regardless of whether the activated table has its own API (eager/lazy loads bypass the repository grep either way)
• isolation test written first and seen red for the mechanism, then green; raw red/green outputs captured in the report
• reads: own row visible, cross-tenant 404, path and header selectors
• writes: attribution asserted at the SQL level, no selector → 400; upsert of the same business key from two tenants yields two rows
• other APIs from the inventory wired and tested
• every association (direct or indirect, lazy or eager) pointing at the entity from ANY other aggregate found (Phase 3b); every lazy accessor reached through serialization (custom serializer, DTO mapper) force- initialized inside a scoped transaction; each fixed entrypoint pinned in both arch tests and covered by a production-like scoped test
• background writers converted to the primitive (no @Transactional, no raw plumbing), each with a per-tenant or allTenants scope and a green background isolation test (Phase 5b)
• native queries on the table (@Query(nativeQuery=true), createNativeQuery) are exercised by a test so a fail-closed rewrite refusal surfaces in CI, not production; any raw JDBC on the table converted to Hibernate (never @AllowRawJdbc on a tenant table)
• codebase-wide scan for any native @Query that JOINs the table (not just its own repository) done and every FROM/JOIN shape in those queries checked against TenantStatementInspector's accepted shapes; any table-function FROM item (jsonb_array_elements, unnest, ...) carries LATERAL; a regression test pins the real production SQL (#7007)
• non-admin variant green
• arch tests updated and green
• go-live is one commit: @Filter removed + allowlist entry + re-enabled test + config guard
• v1 remnant audit complete: no TenantContext/findByIdAndTenantId/TenantBaseListener targeting the activated table remains in the call stack; codebase-wide // TODO v2: markers naming this table's activation issue resolved
• spotless, compile
• report written (degradations, children, client impact, v1 audit table)