Security review

Monty runs untrusted, potentially malicious Python. Review this branch on that basis.

git diff origin/main...HEAD

Use a subagent to run .agents/skills/fix-pr-comments/pr-threads.sh (from the fix-pr-comments skill) for security findings already raised on the PR, and confirm each is properly addressed.

Cover the changes and any code they touch — a caller made unsafe by a changed callee is in scope even if it isn't in the diff. Ask:

• Sandbox escape? Filesystem access outside a mount, path traversal, symlinks resolving out of bounds, network, subprocesses, import-system abuse, callback misuse, leaks through error messages or timing.
• Memory errors? Worse than panics: nothing stops, state is silently corrupt, and it can become arbitrary execution. unsafe, refcount errors causing use-after-free or double-free, unchecked indexing, aliasing violations, integer overflow feeding a length or index.
• Resource limits bypassed? Allocations dodging the ResourceTracker (String without StringBuilder), loops with no fuel check, small input → huge allocation.
• Untrusted input still untrusted? Wire frames from a child are hostile: decoding and proto→Rust conversion must validate everything and never panic. (Snapshots and dumps are trusted by contract — hosts sign and verify them.)
• Panics or aborts? unwrap/expect reachable from sandboxed input, unbounded recursion hitting a stack-overflow abort.
• Mount escapes? Any behaviour that allows sandbox code to escape a filesystem mount and read or alter files outside the mount point. This is particularly severe since mounts are run on the host/client connecting to a sandbox - accessing that environment is a very serious breach of the sandbox and security issue.

Weight both classes by where they land. In a pool worker the process dies, the parent replaces the child and raises an exception — contained. Nothing else is: in host/parent code (monty-pool, monty-proto decoding, monty-fs, the bindings), or in a Rust embedder calling the monty crate in-process, the same bug takes down the application. Scrutinise those hardest, especially anything handling a frame from a child.

crates/monty/src/heap.rs and crates/monty-fs/src/path_security.rs are the two most security-critical files; any change to either needs careful justification. Also check the public API: could a pydantic_monty or @pydantic/monty user misuse this to expose their host?

Report

Per finding: the attack, file:line, the sandboxed Python or hostile frame that triggers it, and the impact. Demonstrate with python-playground rather than asserting where you can. Say which areas you checked and found clean — coverage matters as much as findings.

Report only, unless the user asks for fixes.