Incident Investigation - Instructions

Purpose

This skill performs comprehensive security investigations on incidents from Microsoft Defender XDR and Microsoft Sentinel. It retrieves incident details, lists alerts, enumerates assets and evidences, and then performs deep investigation on user-selected entities using appropriate tools and specialized skills.

Investigation Flow:

1. Phase 1: Incident Description - Retrieve metadata, alerts, assets, and evidences
2. Phase 2: Incident Investigation Menu - Ask the user to select the incident assets and entities that should be investigated.
3. Phase 2-A: User Investigation - Follow user-investigation skill workflow
4. Phase 2-B: Device Investigation - Follow computer-investigation skill workflow
5. Phase 2-C: IoC Investigation - Follow ioc-investigation skill workflow for IPs, URLs, Files, Domains, Hashes
6. Phase 3: Looping to Phase 2 - Ask the user to select the further assets and entities that should be investigated.

📑 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Critical Workflow Rules - Start here!
2. Phase 1: Incident Description - Metadata, Alerts, Assets, Evidences
3. Phase 2: Incident Investigation Menu - Presenting the options
4. Phase 2-A: User Investigation - Using user-investigation skill
5. Phase 2-B: Device Investigation - Using computer-investigation skill
6. Phase 2-C: IoC Investigation - Using ioc-investigation skill (IPs, URLs, Files, Domains, Hashes)
7. Phase 3: Post Incident Investigation - Looping to phase 2
8. JSON Export Structure - Required fields
9. Error Handling - Troubleshooting guide

⚠️ CRITICAL WORKFLOW RULES - READ FIRST ⚠️

Before starting ANY incident investigation:

1. ALWAYS complete Phase 1 first - Retrieve full incident description before any deep investigation
2. ALWAYS list Sentinel workspaces at the START of Phase 2 - Call list_sentinel_workspaces MCP tool BEFORE presenting the investigation menu
3. ⛔ ALWAYS complete workspace selection BEFORE any investigation - This is a MANDATORY CHECKPOINT:
   • If 1 workspace: auto-select and display to user
   • If multiple workspaces: ASK USER to select and WAIT for response
   • DO NOT proceed to any entity investigation without a workspace selected
4. ALWAYS present extracted entities to user - After workspace selection, ask user which entities to investigate
5. ALWAYS wait for user confirmation - Do not proceed with deep investigation until user selects entities
6. ALWAYS use the correct tools for each entity type:
   • Users → Follow .github/skills/user-investigation/SKILL.md
   • Devices → Follow .github/skills/computer-investigation/SKILL.md
   • IPs/URLs/Files/Domains/Hashes → Follow .github/skills/ioc-investigation/SKILL.md
7. ALWAYS track and report time after each major step
8. ALWAYS filter evidences - Remove internal IPs (RFC1918) and tenant domains from investigation scope. Also remove all public IPs from the devices listed as assets involved in the incident.
9. ALWAYS defang malicious/suspicious URLs and IPs - NEVER return them as clickable links. Use defang format: hxxps://evil[.]com, 203[.]0[.]113[.]42
10. ⛔ NEVER auto-select a Sentinel workspace when multiple exist - Workspace selection is MANDATORY:
    • ❌ DO NOT select a workspace on behalf of the user when multiple exist
    • ❌ DO NOT switch to another workspace if a query fails
    • ❌ DO NOT proceed with investigation without explicit user selection
    • ✅ If query fails: STOP, report error, ask user to select different workspace
    • ✅ If multiple workspaces: STOP, list all, WAIT for user selection
    • ✅ Only auto-select if exactly ONE workspace exists

Incident ID Patterns:

⚠️ Sentinel → Defender XDR ID Mapping (Critical):

When an incident is discovered via Sentinel KQL (e.g., SecurityIncident or SecurityAlert tables), its IDs are Sentinel-local and will NOT work with the Triage MCP:

Rule: When querying SecurityIncident for later Triage MCP drill-down, always project ProviderIncidentId alongside IncidentNumber. Use ProviderIncidentId for all GetIncidentById calls.

Date Range Rules:

• Default analysis window: 7 days before current date to current date (Standard)
• Investigation depth options:
  • Comprehensive: 30 days window (for thorough analysis)
  • Standard: 7 days window (default)
  • Quick: 1 day window (for rapid triage)
• Format: ISO 8601 (e.g., 2026-01-17T00:00:00Z to 2026-01-24T00:00:00Z)

Phase 1: Incident Description

This phase retrieves and presents all incident information. Follow the exact structure below.

1.1 Incident Metadata

Retrieve and list the incident's metadata using GetIncidentById:

1.2 Incident Alerts

🔴 Tool Selection for Alert Retrieval

Use GetIncidentById with includeAlertsData=true to retrieve incident-specific alerts. This returns only alerts correlated to the incident.

⛔ DO NOT use ListAlerts to retrieve alerts for a specific incident. ListAlerts has NO incidentId parameter — it can only filter by createdAfter, createdBefore, severity, status. Calling it returns all tenant alerts (up to page size 10,000), not incident-specific ones. Any unsupported parameter (e.g., incidentId) is silently ignored.

If GetIncidentById(includeAlertsData=true) returns a truncated or excessively large response (e.g., incident has hundreds of correlated alerts from noise sources like Purview IRM or DLP), use RunAdvancedHuntingQuery as the fallback:

// Get alerts linked to the incident's primary user/entity
AlertInfo
| where Timestamp > datetime(<incident_created_minus_7d>)
| join kind=inner (
    AlertEvidence
    | where Timestamp > datetime(<incident_created_minus_7d>)
    | where EntityType == "User"
    | where AccountUpn =~ "<primary_user_upn>" or AccountObjectId == "<user_object_id>"
    | distinct AlertId
) on AlertId
| project Timestamp, AlertId, Title, Severity, Category, AttackTechniques, DetectionSource, ServiceSource
| order by Timestamp asc

This approach bypasses the Triage MCP's alert cap and gives full control over date range and entity filtering.

Alert Fields to Retrieve

For each alert, retrieve:

• Alert name
• Tags
• Severity
• Investigation state
• Status
• Impacted assets
• Correlation reason
• Detection source
• First activity
• Last activity

Presentation Rules:

1. Return as a table (exclude Alert ID column from display)
2. Order by last activity date descending
3. Add row numbers starting from 1
4. If more than 30 alerts exist, note this after the table and provide a Defender portal link
5. NEVER calculate and write the total number of alerts

1.3 Incident Assets

Retrieve and list ALL assets involved in the incident by type:

Device Assets:

User Assets:

App Assets:

Cloud Resource Assets:

Count assets by type ONLY after retrieving complete lists.

1.4 Incident Evidences

Retrieve evidences classified as malicious or suspicious only:

Processes (Top 10):

• Get ALL malicious/suspicious processes
• Return only the 10 most probable signs of malicious activity (use judgment)

Files (Top 10):

• Get ALL malicious/suspicious files
• Return only the 10 most probable signs of malicious activity (use judgment)

IP Addresses (Top 10, Filtered):

• Get ALL malicious/suspicious IPs
• Filter out RFC1918 internal IPs: 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x
• Filter out public IPs associated to the devices listed as assets involved in the incident
• Return only the first 10 from filtered list
• DEFANG ALL IPs:** When presenting IPs and domains to the user, ALWAYS use defanged format: 203[.]0[.]113[.]42, evil[.]com. NEVER output clickable malicious indicators.

URLs and DNS Domains (Top 10, Filtered):

• Get ALL malicious/suspicious URLs and DNS Domains
• Filter out tenant domain URLs (DNS domains associated with the organization)
• Return only the first 10 from filtered list
• DEFANG ALL URLs AND DNS DOMAINS:** When presenting URLs to the user, ALWAYS use defanged format: hxxps://evil[.]com/path, hxxp://malware[.]net. NEVER output clickable malicious URLs.

AD Domains:

• Return ALL malicious/suspicious AD domains (no limit)

For each evidence type: If more than 10 exist, note this after the table and provide Defender portal link.

Phase 2: Incident Investigation Menu

⛔ MANDATORY CHECKPOINT: Workspace Selection

This checkpoint MUST be completed before ANY entity investigation can proceed.

Step 2.1: List Sentinel Workspaces

ALWAYS execute this step first, regardless of any other considerations:

list_sentinel_workspaces (MCP tool)

Store the result. This determines the workflow for Step 2.3.

Step 2.2: Present Entity Summary

Show a summary of the incident entities and assets from Phase 1:

• Users (with UPN and display name)
• Devices (with hostname and risk level)
• URLs (defanged)
• IPs (defanged, filtered)
• File hashes
• Domains (defanged)

🔴 DEFANG ALL URLs AND DOMAINS: When presenting URLs and DNS Domains to the user, ALWAYS use defanged format: hxxps://evil[.]com/path, hxxp://malware[.]net, evil[.]com. NEVER output clickable malicious URLs.

🔴 DEFANG ALL IPs: When presenting IPs to the user, ALWAYS use defanged format: 203[.]0[.]113[.]42. NEVER output clickable malicious indicators.

Step 2.3: Workspace Selection Gate

IF workspace_count == 1:
    - Auto-select the single workspace
    - Display: "Using Sentinel workspace: [NAME] ([ID])"
    - Set SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED = true
    
ELSE IF workspace_count > 1 AND SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED == false:
    - Display all workspaces with Name and ID
    - ASK USER: "Which Sentinel workspace should I run my searches in? Select one or more, or choose 'all'."
    - WAIT for user response
    - Set SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED = true after selection
    
ELSE IF workspace_count > 1 AND SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED == true:
    - Display: "Continuing with previously selected workspace: [NAME] ([ID])"
    - DO NOT ask again

⛔ DO NOT PROCEED PAST THIS POINT WITHOUT A WORKSPACE SELECTED

If SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED == false after Step 2.3, STOP and ask the user to select a workspace.

Step 2.4: Ask User to Select Entities

Ask the user:

"Which assets and entities involved in the incident should be investigated in depth? Please select them by providing their numbers or names, or simply ask to analyze all of them. The more entities you select, the longer the analysis will take."

🔴 DO NOT OFFER OTHER OPTIONS: Only ask the user whether they want to investigate one or more of the incident entities and assets listed above in more depth.

Read the response.

• If they do not want to proceed with the proposed investigations, ask them what they want to do.
• If they want to proceed with one or more of the proposed investigations, continue with Step 2.5.

Step 2.5: Start Investigations

Pre-flight check: Confirm SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED == true before proceeding.

Proceed in accordance with the instructions described below for Phase 2-A, Phase 2-B, and Phase 2-C. When multiple investigation types are selected (users, devices, IoCs) run them in parallel as much as possible.

Phase 2-A: User Investigation

Pre-requisites (MANDATORY)

⛔ VERIFY BEFORE PROCEEDING:

• ✅ SESSION_WORKSPACE_SELECTED == true (workspace explicitly selected by user)
• ✅ SELECTED_WORKSPACE_IDS array is populated with user's selection
• ✅ User has explicitly selected which user(s) to investigate

If any pre-requisite is FALSE: STOP and return to Phase 2.3 Workspace Selection Gate.

User Investigation Workflow

⚡ PARALLEL EXECUTION: When multiple users are selected, execute user investigations in parallel as much as possible.

📦 WORKSPACE CONTEXT: Pass the selected workspace(s) to all child skill invocations:

• Use SELECTED_WORKSPACE_IDS from Phase 2.3 for all Sentinel queries
• If a query fails with table/workspace error: STOP, report error, ask user to select different workspace
• ⛔ DO NOT automatically retry with a different workspace

For EACH user selected by the user:

🔴 REFERENCE THE SKILL FILE: Read and follow the complete workflow defined in:

.github/skills/user-investigation/SKILL.md

Key Steps (summary - see skill file for full details):

1. Get User Object ID from Microsoft Graph
2. Calculate date ranges based on investigation type (Standard/Quick/Comprehensive)
3. Run parallel data collection:
   • Sign-in anomalies (Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL — note lowercase 'l' in "logs")
   • Sign-in statistics (apps, locations, IPs)
   • Audit log events
   • Office 365 activity
   • Security incidents involving user
   • Identity Protection risk detections
   • MFA and authentication methods
   • Device compliance status
4. IP enrichment for flagged addresses
5. Compile and present findings
6. Generate HTML report (if requested)

DO NOT copy the full workflow here - always read the skill file for the most current instructions.

Phase 2-B: Device Investigation

Device Investigation Workflow

⚡ PARALLEL EXECUTION: When multiple devices are selected, execute device data collection queries in parallel for ALL devices simultaneously. Run Defender alerts, compliance, logged-on users, vulnerabilities, network/process/file events queries concurrently.

For EACH device selected by the user:

🔴 REFERENCE THE SKILL FILE: Read and follow the complete workflow defined in:

.github/skills/computer-investigation/SKILL.md

Key Steps (summary - see skill file for full details):

1. Get Device IDs (Entra Device ID + Defender Device ID)
2. Determine device type (Entra Joined, Hybrid Joined, Entra Registered)
3. Run parallel data collection:
   • Defender alerts for device
   • Device compliance status
   • Logged-on users
   • Software vulnerabilities
   • Network connections
   • Process events
   • File events
   • Automated investigations
4. Compile and present findings

DO NOT copy the full workflow here - always read the skill file for the most current instructions.

Phase 2-C: IoC Investigation

IoC Investigation Workflow

⚡ PARALLEL EXECUTION: When multiple IoCs are selected, execute ALL IoC investigation queries in parallel. Run threat intel lookups, Sentinel queries, and organizational exposure queries concurrently for all IoCs.

For EACH IoC selected by the user:

🔴 REFERENCE THE SKILL FILE: Read and follow the complete workflow defined in:

.github/skills/ioc-investigation/SKILL.md

Supported IoC Types:

Key Steps (summary - see skill file for full details):

1. Identify IoC type and normalize
2. Query Defender Threat Intelligence
3. Check Sentinel ThreatIntelIndicators table
4. Analyze organizational exposure (devices, connections)
5. Correlate with CVEs if applicable
6. Present findings with risk assessment

DO NOT copy the full workflow here - always read the skill file for the most current instructions.

Phase 3: Post-Investigation Loop (MANDATORY)

⛔ CRITICAL: DO NOT END THE RESPONSE WITHOUT COMPLETING THIS PHASE

After completing ALL selected entity investigations in Phase 2, you MUST:

1. List remaining uninvestigated entities - Show all entities from Phase 1 that were NOT yet investigated
2. Ask the user to select additional entities - Prompt user to continue or conclude
3. Wait for user response - Do not assume the investigation is complete

Phase 3 Checklist (Execute After Every Phase 2 Completion)

☐ Step 3.1: Compile list of UNINVESTIGATED entities (exclude already-investigated items)
☐ Step 3.2: Present remaining entities to user with numbered list
☐ Step 3.3: Ask: "Would you like to investigate any of the remaining entities? Select by number/name, or say 'done' to conclude."
☐ Step 3.4: Wait for user response before concluding

Required Prompt Format

After presenting investigation findings, ALWAYS end with:

📋 Remaining Uninvestigated Entities:

#	Type	Entity	Notes
1	Device	[DEVICE_NAME]	[Risk level or relevant context]
2	File	[FILENAME]	[Hash or detection status]
3	URL	[DEFANGED_URL]	[Threat assessment]
...	...	...	...

Would you like to investigate any of these remaining entities? Select by number/name, type "all" to investigate everything, or say "done" to conclude the investigation.

Rules

• DO NOT include entities that were already investigated in the list
• DO NOT ask the user to select Sentinel workspaces again (use previously selected workspace)
• DO NOT provide a final summary or recommendations until the user explicitly says "done" or declines further investigation
• DO NOT assume the investigation is complete just because selected entities were analyzed

Loop Behavior

IF user selects additional entities:
    → Return to Phase 2 (2-A, 2-B, or 2-C based on entity type)
    → After completion, return to Phase 3 again
    
ELSE IF user says "done" or declines:
    → Proceed to Final Summary
    → Provide recommendations
    → Offer to generate consolidated report

Sentinel MCP Tools Reference

analyze_user_entity

Purpose: Starts asynchronous security analysis of a user entity.

Parameters:

Time Window Options: 30 days (Comprehensive), 7 days (Standard), 1 day (Quick)

Returns: 202 Accepted with analysisId

get_entity_analysis

Purpose: Retrieves results of an asynchronous entity analysis.

Parameters:

Returns: 200 OK with analysis results when complete, or status if still processing

Quick Start (TL;DR)

When a user requests an incident investigation:

1. Phase 1 - Incident Description:

   • Retrieve incident metadata using GetIncidentById
   • List top 30 alerts as a table
   • Enumerate all assets by type (devices, users, apps, cloud resources)
   • List filtered evidences (processes, files, IPs, URLs, domains)

2. ⛔ Phase 2 - Mandatory Workspace Selection:

   • Call list_sentinel_workspaces MCP tool FIRST
   • Present entity summary from Phase 1
   • If 1 workspace: auto-select and display
   • If multiple workspaces: ASK USER to select before proceeding
   • DO NOT proceed to investigations without a workspace selected

3. Phase 2-A - User Investigation:

   • For each selected user: Follow .github/skills/user-investigation/SKILL.md
   • Present findings

4. Phase 2-B - Device Investigation:

   • For each selected device: Follow .github/skills/computer-investigation/SKILL.md
   • Present findings

5. Phase 2-C - IoC Investigation:

   • For each selected IoC (IPs, URLs, Files, Domains, Hashes): Follow .github/skills/ioc-investigation/SKILL.md
   • Present findings

6. Export & Summary:

   • Create consolidated JSON file
   • Present investigation summary with recommendations

JSON Export Structure

Required Fields

Example JSON Structure

{
  "investigation_metadata": {
    "incident_id": "<INCIDENT_ID>",
    "investigation_timestamp": "<ISO_TIMESTAMP>",
    "phases_completed": ["incident_description", "user_investigation", "device_investigation", "ioc_investigation"],
    "total_elapsed_time_seconds": 300
  },
  "incident_details": {
    "metadata": {
      "title": "<INCIDENT_TITLE>",
      "description": "<DESCRIPTION>",
      "severity": "<SEVERITY>",
      "status": "<STATUS>",
      "classification": "<CLASSIFICATION>",
      "determination": "<DETERMINATION>",
      "created_date": "<TIMESTAMP>",
      "first_activity_date": "<TIMESTAMP>",
      "last_updated_date": "<TIMESTAMP>",
      "assigned_to": "<ANALYST>",
      "mitre_categories": ["<TACTIC1>", "<TACTIC2>"],
      "tags": ["<TAG1>", "<TAG2>"]
    },
    "alerts": [
      {
        "name": "<ALERT_NAME>",
        "severity": "<SEVERITY>",
        "status": "<STATUS>",
        "first_activity": "<TIMESTAMP>",
        "last_activity": "<TIMESTAMP>"
      }
    ],
    "assets": {
      "devices": [...],
      "users": [...],
      "apps": [...],
      "cloud_resources": [...]
    },
    "evidences": {
      "processes": [...],
      "files": [...],
      "ip_addresses": [...],
      "urls": [...],
      "ad_domains": [...]
    }
  },
  "user_investigations": [
    {
      "upn": "user@domain.com",
      "user_id": "<GUID>",
      "analysis_id": "<ANALYSIS_ID>",
      "time_window": {
        "start": "<ISO_TIMESTAMP>",
        "end": "<ISO_TIMESTAMP>"
      },
      "findings": {...},
      "risk_level": "High"
    }
  ],
  "device_investigations": [
    {
      "hostname": "<DEVICE_NAME>",
      "device_id": "<GUID>",
      "findings": {...}
    }
  ],
  "ioc_investigations": [
    {
      "ioc_type": "IP",
      "value": "203.0.113.42",
      "findings": {...}
    },
    {
      "ioc_type": "URL",
      "value": "https://example.com",
      "findings": {...},
      "threat_assessment": "Malicious"
    }
  ],
  "summary": {
    "risk_assessment": "High",
    "key_findings": [...],
    "recommendations": [...]
  }
}

Error Handling

Common Issues and Solutions

Workspace ID Retrieval

If workspace ID is unknown, retrieve it first:

list_sentinel_workspaces (MCP tool)

Returns: List of workspace name/ID pairs

Workspace ID Selection

If there is more than one Sentinel workspace (as retrieved from list_sentinel_workspaces MCP tool), present the list - in terms of workspace names and IDs - to the user so that the user can select which workspace to use for the investigation. Offer also to the user the possibility to use all existing workspaces.

If only one workspace is selected by the user, use the workspaceId of that workspace when calling investigation tools.

If the user asks to consider more than one workspace, use one by one the workspaceId of all of them when calling investigation tools.

Time Window Limits

Example Investigation Workflow

User Request: "Investigate incident 12345"

Phase 1: Incident Description

[00:00] Starting incident investigation for ID: 12345

### Incident Metadata
- **Title:** Multi-stage attack with credential theft
- **Severity:** High
- **Status:** Active
- **Classification:** TruePositive
- **Created:** 2026-01-20T10:30:00Z
- **MITRE Categories:** Initial Access, Credential Access, Lateral Movement

### Incident Alerts 
| # | Alert Name | Severity | Status | Last Activity |
|---|------------|----------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | Suspicious sign-in from unusual location | High | New | 2026-01-23 |
| 2 | Credential theft attempt detected | High | InProgress | 2026-01-22 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

### Incident Assets
**Devices:**
| Name | Domain | Risk Level | OS |
|------|--------|------------|-----|
| WORKSTATION-01 | contoso.com | High | Windows 11 |
| LAPTOP-EXEC | contoso.com | Medium | Windows 11 |
| SERVER-DC01 | contoso.com | Low | Windows Server 2022 |

**Users:**
| Display Name | UPN | Status | Department |
|--------------|-----|--------|------------|
| John Smith | jsmith@contoso.com | Active | Finance |
| Admin Account | admin@contoso.com | Active | IT |
| Jane Doe | jdoe@contoso.com | Active | HR |
| Service Account | svc-backup@contoso.com | Active | IT |

### Incident Evidences
**IPs (after filtering - excluded private IPs):**
- `203[.]0[.]113[.]42` (Malicious - C2 communication)
- `198[.]51[.]100[.]10` (Suspicious - Data exfiltration)
- `192[.]0[.]2[.]50` (Suspicious - Unusual connection)
...

**URLs (after filtering - excluded managed domains):**
- `hxxps://evil-site[.]com/payload[.]exe` (Malicious)
- `hxxps://phishing[.]example[.]com/login` (Suspicious)
...

[01:30] Phase 1 completed (90 seconds)

Phase 2-A: User Investigation

Which users from the incident assets should be investigated deeply?
Available users:
1. jsmith@contoso.com (Finance)
2. admin@contoso.com (IT)
3. jdoe@contoso.com (HR)
4. svc-backup@contoso.com (IT)

User selects: "1, 2"

[01:35] Starting parallel user analysis for 2 users...
- Getting user Object IDs from Graph API (parallel)
- Starting analyze_user_entity for jsmith@contoso.com (Analysis ID: abc123-def456)
- Starting analyze_user_entity for admin@contoso.com (Analysis ID: xyz789-ghi012)
- Polling for results (parallel)...
[02:15] All analyses complete

### User Analysis: jsmith@contoso.com
**Risk Level:** High
**Key Findings:**
1. Sign-in from unusual location (IP: `203[.]0[.]113[.]42`, Country: Russia)
2. Multiple failed MFA attempts followed by success
3. Unusual file access pattern detected
...

### User Analysis: admin@contoso.com
**Risk Level:** Medium
**Key Findings:**
1. Service account usage from new device
...

[02:20] Phase 2-A completed (45 seconds - parallel execution)

Phase 2-B: Device Investigation

Which devices from the incident assets should be investigated deeply?
Available devices:
1. WORKSTATION-01 (High risk)
2. LAPTOP-EXEC (Medium risk)
3. SERVER-DC01 (Low risk)

User selects: "1"

[03:10] Starting device investigation for WORKSTATION-01...
- Following computer-investigation skill workflow
- Getting device IDs (Entra + Defender)
- Running parallel queries...
[04:30] Device investigation complete

### Device Analysis: WORKSTATION-01
**Key Findings:**
1. Malware execution detected (sha256: abc123...)
2. Outbound C2 communication to 203.0.113.42
3. Credential dumping tool found
...

[04:35] Phase 2-B completed (85 seconds)

Phase 2-C: IoC Investigation

Which IPs, URLs, Files, Domains, or Hashes should be investigated deeply?
Available IoCs:
1. 203[.]0[.]113[.]42 (IP - C2 communication)
2. 198[.]51[.]100[.]10 (IP - Data exfiltration)
3. hxxps://evil-site[.]com/payload[.]exe (URL - Malicious)
4. hxxps://phishing[.]example[.]com/login (URL - Suspicious)
5. abc123def456... (Hash - Malware)

User selects: "1, 3, 4, 5"

[04:40] Starting parallel IoC investigation for 4 IoCs...
- Following ioc-investigation skill workflow
- Running threat intel, Sentinel, and exposure queries in parallel for all IoCs
[05:30] All IoC analyses complete

### IP Analysis: 203[.]0[.]113[.]42
**Threat Assessment:** Malicious
**Key Findings:**
1. Known C2 infrastructure
2. Associated with threat actor APT-XYZ
...

### URL Analysis: hxxps://evil-site[.]com/payload[.]exe
**Threat Assessment:** Malicious
**Key Findings:**
1. Known malware distribution domain
2. 3 devices in organization accessed this URL
...

### URL Analysis: hxxps://phishing[.]example[.]com/login
**Threat Assessment:** Suspicious
**Key Findings:**
1. Phishing page mimicking corporate login
...

### Hash Analysis: abc123def456...
**Threat Assessment:** Malicious
**Key Findings:**
1. Known malware sample
...

[05:35] Phase 2-C completed (55 seconds - parallel execution)

[05:45] Investigation Summary
=========================
**Incident:** 12345 - Multi-stage attack with credential theft
**Total Investigation Time:** 4 minutes 10 seconds (optimized with parallel execution)

**Key Findings:**
1. Compromised user account (jsmith@contoso.com) used for initial access
2. Malware deployed on WORKSTATION-01 establishing C2 channel
3. Credential theft attempt targeting admin account
4. Data exfiltration attempts detected

**Recommendations:**
1. 🔴 CRITICAL: Isolate WORKSTATION-01 immediately
2. 🔴 CRITICAL: Reset credentials for jsmith@contoso.com and admin@contoso.com
3. 🟠 HIGH: Block IP `203[.]0[.]113[.]42` at firewall
4. 🟠 HIGH: Block domain `evil-site[.]com`
5. 🟡 MEDIUM: Review all sign-ins for affected users in past 30 days

**Export:** temp/incident_investigation_12345_20260124.json

Integration with Skill Files

This skill orchestrates investigations by referencing specialized skills:

🔴 ALWAYS read the referenced skill file before executing that phase to ensure proper workflow execution.